Popular Sovereignty, Judicial Supremacy, and the American Revolution: Why the Judiciary
Cannot Be the Final Arbiter of Constitutions
By William J. Watkins, Jr.
The development of constitutional government in Great Britain and America is
inseparable from the debate and the conflict over sovereignty. In Britain, parliamentary
sovereignty triumphed over the divine right of kings to form the foundation of British liberty. In
America, popular sovereignty triumphed over parliamentary/legislative sovereignty to render
government the servant of the people. Without acceptance of popular sovereignty, judicial
review would likely be unknown in the United States.1 Under parliamentary/legislative
sovereignty, the legislative body exercises ultimate authority over statutory law and fundamental
law. The legislature can make or repeal law as it sees fit. With the exception of revolution,
neither the judiciary, executive, nor people can override the legislature’s will.
Under popular sovereignty, the executive, legislative, and judiciary are mere agents of the
people and the people’s constitution. In performing their constitutional functions, the branches
must interpret the constitution to ensure that their actions conform to the instrument. In the
judicial context, a court must compare a statute in controversy with the text of the constitution
before giving effect to the statute. For example, if a constitution secures the right to trial by jury
in all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $100 and the legislature passes a
statute increasing the jurisdictional amount to $500, a non-jury verdict for $400 would be void if
one of the litigants had demanded a jury trial. The judiciary would be bound to declare such a
judgment a nullity on the grounds that an act of the legislature cannot alter the people’s
fundamental law.
Although judicial review naturally flows from principles of popular sovereignty, judicial
supremacy does not. Judicial supremacy, as framed by the United States Supreme Court in
Cooper v. Aaron, provides that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution.”2 Once the judiciary interprets a constitutional provision, neither the executive
nor legislature can offer a competing interpretation in the performance of their constitutional
duties. The matter is settled because the judiciary has spoken.
This article shows that Americans of the Founding generation understood judicial review
not as a counterweight against popular government, but as a consequence of popular sovereignty
and indeed as a support of it. The original understanding of judicial review, I show, not only
differs from the doctrine of judicial supremacy later embraced by the modern Supreme Court in
decisions like Cooper v. Aaron, but is actually incompatible with the modern conception of
judicial supremacy.
Section One of this article traces the defeat of divine right theory in England and the
emergence of parliamentary sovereignty. Section Two considers the American colonists’
rejection of parliamentary sovereignty during the Revolution and their establishment of popular
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sovereignty as the cardinal principle of American constitutionalism. Section Three studies
English precedent often cited as providing the basis for the American doctrine of judicial review
and shows that these English cases were simply exercises in statutory construction and cannot be
classified as precursors to American judicial review. The final section examines the
development of judicial review in American state courts both prior to and after ratification of the
United States Constitution. This section also examines Marbury v. Madison in the context of
these early state court decisions and concludes that Chief Justice Marshall never contemplated
establishing the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of our Constitution. A believer in popular
sovereignty, Marshall would not have reverted to British practice whereby a branch of
government has total control over fundamental law. Instead, the Marbury opinion—like the state
decisions before it—simply recognized that the judiciary is a co-equal branch of government
empowered to interpret the Constitution along with the president and Congress.
I.

The Struggle Over Sovereignty in Stuart England

The acceptance of popular sovereignty in the United States cannot be understood outside
the context of English history and the conflict between Crown and Parliament. The English Civil
War and Glorious Revolution set the stage for the American Revolution and radical ideas about
the power of the people. Principles of popular sovereignty were first seriously debated during
the 1640s in England. With the defeat of royalist forces and execution of the king, Englishmen
examined the tenets of monarchical and republican theory. But for the instability of the
Interregnum, theorists and soldiers arguing for popular sovereignty could have taken a
tremendous leap forward in the realm of political science. Although unsuccessful in England,
these heterodox theorists put forward ideas that seventy years later would take hold in America.
A.

The Influence of Jean Bodin

Sovereignty is the supreme power of governance.3 Any discussion of sovereignty should
begin with Jean Bodin’s République, which was first published in 1576.4 This book is the
earliest known comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of sovereignty.5 In République, Bodin
began with the proposition that a ruler “is absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after
God, that is greater than himself.”6 Sovereign princes were, in Bodin’s words, God’s “lieutenants
for commanding other men;” therefore, “[c]ontempt for one’s sovereign prince is contempt
toward God, of whom he is the earthly image.”7 For Bodin, there were seven prerogatives of
sovereignty: 1) declaring war and peace, 2) hearing appeals from inferior officials, 3) removing
and appointing government functionaries, 4) imposing taxes, 5) granting pardons, 6) coining
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money, and 7) requiring subjects to swear loyalty oaths.8
Importantly, Bodin believed that the prerogatives of sovereign power were “indivisible.”9
Only one entity could exercise the seven prerogatives. Otherwise, the supposed co-sovereigns
would clash until one prevailed as the ultimate sovereign. Bodin did recognize that the sovereign
entity could be one man (monarchy), a few elite (aristocracy), or the entire people (democracy).10
But the tenor of his work is geared to that of a monarchy–the system with which he and his
contemporaries were most familiar.
Although Bodin spoke of absolute sovereignty, he believed that natural law placed
certain limits on the sovereign’s power.11 Precise natural law principles are difficult to define,
but Bodin claimed that at a minimum the natural law required a sovereign to respect the property
of his people. According to Bodin, “[i]f the prince, then, does not have the power to overstep the
bounds of natural law, which has been established by God, of whom he is the image, he will also
not be able to take another’s property without just and reasonable cause–as by purchase,
exchange, lawful confiscation.”12 If the king did violate the natural law by wrongfully depriving
a subject of his property, the only remedy was a polite remonstrance. The real wrong, in Bodin’s
mind, was to God. Thus, the subject was forbidden to resist the sovereign prince in cases where
natural law had been violated.13
Bodin’s thinking about sovereignty provides a backdrop for discussions between the
Stuart monarchs and Parliament about the locus of sovereignty in the English system. They both
saw sovereignty as indivisible but differed on its location. The Stuarts claimed that sovereignty
resided in the king’s royal person whereas Parliament contended that the king working in
conjunction with Parliament was sovereign. The king especially agreed with Bodin’s description
of the prince as God’s lieutenant on earth and the inability of Parliament or the people to punish
him for violation of positive or natural law. In the end, Englishmen rejected this royal immunity
because of the Crown’s abuse of power.
B.

The Stuart Theory of Divine Right
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Elizabeth I ruled England from her succession to the throne in 1558 until her
death in 1603.14 Unlike her father Henry VIII who ruled by fear, Elizabeth was popular with her
people and used this devotion to impose her will.15 Her long reign is rightly associated with
masterful statecraft, exploration, imperial expansion, and myriad literary and cultural
achievements. Because she had no children, her cousin James Stuart of Scotland was proclaimed
James I of England shortly after her death.16 While James was no match for Elizabeth in the
realm of statecraft, he was much experienced in the art of kingship. Having ruled Scotland for
18 years before succession to the English throne, James did not begin his reign as a novice
monarch. Unfortunately, this experience and his admiration of Elizabeth’s wealth could not
persuade James to embrace his predecessor’s Tudor ideals of efficiency in government. Instead,
he saw royal offices as primarily a means of rewarding supporters.17 His entourage dwarfed that
of Elizabeth and caused many to take note of the extravagance at court.18
Philosophically, James was a monarch cut from the Bodin mold.19 Although ignorant of
England and its system of government, James was well versed in the divine right of kings20 and
expected total obedience from his subjects.21 He saw the realm as one great chain of being22 in
which he occupied a spot just under God. James’s brand of divine right consisted of four
elements: indefeasibility of hereditary right, accountability of kings to God alone, non-resistance
of subjects, and divine ordination of monarchy as a governing institution.23
The English clergy were instrumental in helping James spread this message to the people.
Considering that under the Act of Supremacy in 153424 the King was the head of the Church in
England, such propaganda from the pulpit is not surprising.25 A prime example of this is a
sermon preached by William Goodwin in 1614. “Who can lay his hand upon God’s annointed,”
asked Goodwin, “and be innocent? Who can? No man, Because God hath planted him above all
men, and hath given no man authority to punish Him; God alone will take vengeance on his
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sinnes.”26 Goodwin recognized that a monarch could be cruel to his people. God, however,
preferred order to rebellion and thus prohibited any kind of revolutionary act:
God, which is the God of order, & not of confusion, foresaw in his wisdome, that
it were better for the estates of Kingdomes, & lesse injurious to his Church, if the
insolency of a wicked King, were sometimes tolerated without controll, than that
the estate of his chiefe deputy, and Lieutenant upon the earth should be subjected
to change and alteration, to deprivation, or deposing, at the pleasure and partialitie
of either Priest, or of People.27
Roger Maynwaring further advised the people that suffering would make them “martyars,”
whereas civil disobedience would make them “traitors” in the eyes of God and subject to eternal
damnation.28
With regard to Parliament as an institution, the royalists believed that Parliament was not
a necessary ingredient for the realm’s governance. In 1626, Sir Dudley Carleton warned
Englishmen that the king could easily fall “out of love with parliaments” and “be enforced to use
new counsels” in governing the kingdom.29 At this time in English history, the king had much
control over Parliament. He decided when it should convene and disperse, and no statute could
pass without his consent.
While the king asserted that he “was beholden to no elective power,”30 Parliament had
much control over the purse strings and ordinary legislation. As early as the fourteenth century,
English kings had agreed that no tallage or aid would be levied without the consent of the
freeman of the realm.31 Hence, actual practice differed somewhat from royalist theory.
In contrast to the royalists, parliamentarians emphasized the doctrine of king-inparliament. “[F]or acts of parliament, be they laws, grounds, or whatsoever else,” observed MP
James Whitelocke in 1610, “the act and power is the king’s but with the assent of the Lords and
Commons, which maketh it the most sovereign and supreme power above all and controllable by
none.”32 Under parliamentarian theory, the king, Lords, and Commons together in one house
were omni-competent. God had conferred the power of governance on the entire community,
and this community, in turn, delegated powers to the king “subject to the conditions that he make
laws and impose taxes only in Parliament.”33 In other words, the Lords and Commons were the
king’s partners in governance of the realm.
26
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C.

The Development of Parliament

Parliament did not originate as the powerful institution described by Whitelocke. It
developed over time from the principle that the great magnates of the realm owed the king a duty
of counsel and consent.34 Of course, since time immemorial kings solicited the advice of the
great barons of the realm.35 For example, in 1086 William the Conqueror held a colloquy with
his magnates before launching the Domesday survey of the wealth of his vassals.36 Christmas,
Easter, and Whitsunday conveniently provided three yearly opportunities for the king and his
barons to feast and discuss the pressing issues of the day.37 In addition to providing advice on
political and administrative issues, the assemblies of barons also performed judicial functions in
that they advised the king’s court on judgments to be rendered.38
By the 1230s, the word “parliament” was used to denote a special meeting of the king’s
council.39 But more formal organized parliaments did not begin until 1258.40 In that year, Henry
III was in an impecunious position. He had attempted to purchase the Sicilian crown for his son
Edmund. In exchange for the crown, Henry agreed to provide the pope with an army and to
serve as surety for papal debts.41 Before coming to the financial aid of the king, the magnates
demanded reform of the government–reforms placing much power in the barons’ hands. Seeing
no way out, the king agreed to institute changes known today as the Provisions of Oxford. The
main reform crafted by the baronial and royal parties was a council of fifteen chosen to advise
and assist the king. This council would be elected by two persons from the royal camp and two
from the barons’ camp, which was described as “the community of the realm.”42 In addition,
Parliament was scheduled to meet three time per year.43 Hence, we see the “community of the
realm” choosing the king’s advisors and the community’s representatives44 meeting thrice each
year in Parliament.
Although the power of the barons waxed and waned in the years after the Provisions of
Oxford, Parliament would remain a key English institution from 1258 forward. By the middle of
the next century, representatives of certain towns and counties began to participate in
Parliament.45 The increasing need for the “commons” can be traced to England’s involvement in
the Hundred Years’ War beginning in 1337 and the army’s constant need for supplies. With the
tax burden growing, the king required the consent of not just the magnates, but also the burgesses
34
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and knights.46 As Parliament became more representative, we see a commensurate decline in its
judicial functions.47 According to Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “[a]fter 1327, [Parliament’s] judicial
functions began to diminish in importance, and political business assumed greater
prominence.”48 A relatively new feature of this political business was the origination of
legislation from the petitions of the Commons.49 While this practice was significant, these
petitions were freely amended by the king and barons for years to come.50
The brief discussion above is not to imply that some sort of constitutional monarchy
developed in the Middle Ages. Often kings eschewed calling a parliament and instead summoned
great councils of barons to assist in governance.51 For example, from 1485 to 1509 Henry VII
called only seven parliaments–a far cry from the three times per year mandated by the Provisions
of Oxford.52 In addition, via the royal prerogative the king had the “power to dispense with any
legislative provision.”53 Real power remained with the Crown, but Parliament’s influence
continued to grow.
D.

The Coming of Civil War

Unlike in earlier ages, the struggles between the Stuarts and their parliaments would
become an all-or-nothing affair. Much of this tension was caused by events on the Continent
where European monarchs were limiting the power of (and in some cases eliminating)
representative assemblies.54 Desperately short of funds, James frightened many of the Commons
by resorting to schemes for extra-parliamentary revenue. The selling of titles, forced loans,
increases in the customs duties, and more frequent use of patents and monopolies brought
additional monies into the king’s coffers.55 The monarch’s reliance on Parliament for money had
always been critical to the growth and maintenance of parliamentary power. Hence, James’s
efforts seemed to threaten the very existence of Parliament.
Tensions between the parliamentarians and royalists during James’s reign were very real,
but they were also manageable. Once Charles I assumed the throne in 1625, the divide between
the competing camps grew so that civil war was inevitable. Unlike his father, Charles involved
England in foreign wars with France and Spain. The wars caused the Crown’s finances to
become more impecunious, which in turn caused Charles to exercise his so-called emergency
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prerogative powers to raise revenue.56
Extra-parliamentary revenue aside, matters of religion also fostered an attitude of distrust
between Charles and Parliament. Charles married the Catholic, French princess Henrietta Maria,
and he was somewhat lax in enforcement of restrictions against Catholics. English Protestants
saw a popish fifth column infiltrating the king’s court. So incensed was Parliament over these
developments that many in the Commons sought to make “capital enemies” out of those who
encouraged the king to levy taxes not authorized by Parliament or who sought to advance the
cause of Catholicism in the realm.57
Relations between king and Parliament eventually reached the point where Charles
decided to go it alone. On March 10, 1629, he dissolved Parliament and did not call another
Parliament until 1640. The King gave myriad reasons for dissolving Parliament, but central to
the decision was Parliament’s alleged attempts “to extend their privileges” at the expense of the
royal prerogative.58 In order to survive financially, Charles implemented a policy of
retrenchment and resorted to even more extra-parliamentary revenues.59
Charles’s attempt to rule without Parliament ended when he faced a war with the Scots.
After almost eleven years of personal rule, war forced the king to summon a parliament. Charles
expected that the dangers of a Scottish army were so obvious to all Englishmen that he would
receive a generous grant of revenue from Parliament. Instead, he was greeted with calls for
reform of the government.60 Angered by the grievances presented, Charles disbanded Parliament
within a few days. On August 20, 1640, the Scottish army crossed the Tweed and soon took
Newcastle. With no money to mount resistance, Charles agreed to a truce with the Scots
whereby be promised to pay them £850 per day while they occupied England. Faced with this
exaction, Charles saw no other alternative but to summon another parliament.
Once Charles summoned the “Long Parliament,” government reform was again the focal
point. “[There is] a design to alter the kingdom in both religion and government,” warned
parliamentarian John Pym. “This is the highest of treason, this blows up by piecemeal, and
almost goeth through [to] their ends.”61 The alterations Pym spoke of were a growing Catholic
influence at court and the eleven years of rule by royal prerogative. To address the concerns,
Parliament passed several legislative acts. The most important of these was the Triennial Act of
1641, which provided that a parliament would be summoned at least every three years even
without royal sanction. Parliament also declared illegal all non-parliamentary taxation, ending
the king’s use of fiscal feudalism. Having the upper hand, the Long Parliament declared that the
king could not unilaterally dissolve it. Faced with a hostile army in the north, the king
acquiesced to parliamentary demands.
56
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Parliament, however, sought to push much further than this. In June 1642, Parliament
demanded the power to appoint the king’s advisors and other great officers of state.62 They also
demanded control of the army.63 Control of the army was an especially important issue at the
time because of a widespread rebellion by Irish Catholics. Protestant parliamentarians did not
trust the king to quell the rebellion; therefore, they demanded control of the country’s military
forces. Rejecting Parliament’s demands, the king responded that “[t]he good of monarchy is the
uniting a nation under one head to resist invasion from abroad and insurrection at home.”64 He
further insisted that under the laws of the realm “the government . . . is [en]trusted to the king.”65
Within a few short months the English Civil War would begin.
E.

War and Political Heterodoxy

Battle soon proved that royal forces were no match for Parliament’s New Model Army
(“NMA”) under the leadership of Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell. Unlike past armies,
success in the NMA was based on merit rather than bloodlines. So effective was the NMA that
by 1646 Charles surrendered to Scottish authorities and by 1649 he was executed. The NMA
was more than just a fighting force; it also had a political agenda. In Putney, the NMA set up a
debating society where men elected from the various regiments discussed the proper framework
and foundation of a just society. With the collapse of the old order, the soldiers as well as
civilians were free to put forward heterodox opinions representing viewpoints from across the
political spectrum. On the extreme Left were the “Diggers,” a group advocating the abolishment
of private property and the creation of communistic state.66 More conservative elements favored
establishment of some sort of limited monarchy. Others argued that a new government should be
grounded in republican principles.
As part of its political agenda and in response to calls that it disband, the NMA demanded
that “unjust and corrupt” parliamentarians be purged, future parliaments be for a fixed duration,
and the people be permitted to freely petition Parliament.67 The NMA eventually purged the
Long Parliament of its more conservative members, leaving but a “Rump Parliament.” The
Rump promptly declared that all power originated in the people, the House of Commons
exercised supreme power, and acts of the Commons, with or without consent of a king or Lords,
were law.68 The Rump’s assertions about the power of the people were grandiloquent, but only
served to empower the Rump and its military masters with ultimate power.69 Before long, Oliver
Cromwell and his musketeers expelled members of the Rump and declared Cromwell the lord
protector of England.
Although unsuccessful, there was a sizeable movement that advocated revolutionary
62
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principles of popular sovereignty. Up until this point in English history there were primarily two
competing views of ultimate sovereignty. Royalists argued that ultimate sovereignty resided in
the king and parliamentarians argued that it resided with the king-in-parliament. With the king
dead, there arose claims in the late 1640s that the NMA was sovereign and an expression of the
people’s will. In other words, the NMA was the people.70
A group within the NMA known as “the Levellers,”71 however, developed the novel idea
that ultimate authority resided in the people themselves. Institutions of government, under the
Leveller theory, were but agents of the people and could only exercise delegated powers with the
consent of the people. In the words of Leveller leader John Lilburne, it was “tyrannical” for any
person to “assume unto himself a power, authority and jurisdiction, to rule, govern or reign over
any sort of men in the world without their free consent.”72 And if ever the people’s agents
exceeded the delegated powers, all power “returneth from whence it came, even to the hands of
the [people].”73
To put theory into practice, the Levellers created the Agreement of the People, which
would have required the signature of all citizens before it became effective. In essence, this was
a written constitution whereby the people, as ultimate sovereigns, delegated certain powers to
their representatives.
That the power of this, and all future Representatives of this nation is inferior only
to theirs who choose them, and doth extend, without the consent or concurrence
of any other person or persons, to the enacting, altering, and repealing of laws; to
the erecting and abolishing of offices and courts; to the appointing, removing, and
calling to account magistrates and officers of all degrees; to the making of war
and peace; to the treating with foreign states; and generally to whatsoever is not
expressly or impliedly reserved by the represented themselves.74
There then followed a reservation of rights that prohibited the representatives from doing such
things as interfering with religion or conscripting citizens.75 The ideas of the Levellers were
radical and ahead of their time. Unfortunately, the Agreement of the People was rejected by the
dominant political powers and Leveller leaders were charged with sedition. The essence of
Leveller theory would not be embraced until the next century when a people emerging from their
own revolution had the courage to challenge long held beliefs about sovereignty.
But the England of the late 1640s and early 1650s was not amenable to such a heterodox
document as the Agreement of the People. The Interregnum had been a disorderly and
tumultuous episode; more voices demanded a return to economic and political stability. After
Cromwell’s death in 1658, England was desperately in need of leadership. General George
70
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Monk in 1660 marched on London and restored the excluded members of the Rump. Parliament
convened, dissolved itself, and ordered a general election. On the advice of Monk, Charles II
issued the Declaration of Breda. He promised a full pardon to all, payment of amounts owing
the army, and confirmation of sales of land concluded since the war began in 1642.76 Based on
the promises made at Breda, the new Parliament (or convention as it was called) invited the son
of the murdered king to return to England.
F. Restoration and Triumph of Parliament
The Stuart restoration settled very little. Extensive time abroad had made Charles II
more French than English. Danger also lurked because the king was a secret Catholic in a land
where fear of popish plots remained strong.77 Making matters worse, Charles embarked on a
pro-French foreign policy and signed the secret Treaty of Dover with Louis XIV whereby
Charles agreed to announce his Catholic faith at a convenient time and Louis promised Charles a
pension and troops to make England safe for Catholicism.78 Moreover, Parliament worried that
the money it did grant the king was wasted by Charles in paying for his numerous mistresses and
bastard children. It was well known that the king preferred to spend his time on the pleasures of
the flesh rather than the affairs of state. Concerns also abounded that the Charles’s successor
would be openly Catholic inasmuch as James, Duke of York and heir to the throne, had refused
to take the Anglican sacrament.79
Claims that supreme authority resided in the king survived the execution of Charles I and
were again trotted out after the Restoration. For example, John Brydall in 1681 described the
king as “the sole Legislator” who alone “gives Life, and Being, and Title of Laws” with or
without the consent of Parliament.80 Parliament, in Brydall’s words, was “only Consultative or
Preparative” in the making of law.81 An anonymous royalist pamphleteer writing in 1683 was
more blunt: “In the presence of His Majesty, both, or either Houses of Parliament, have no
Power to command . . . . So the Power of both or either Houses of Parliament, is but upon
sufferance, in the presence of their Sovereign His Majesty.”82
Despite such broad claims regarding the king’s powers, when James II assumed the
throne in 1685 the political situation was manageable–especially since James had no offspring
and thus the people anticipated that a Protestant would succeed him. This quickly changed when
James refused to be a quiet Catholic and his wife unexpectedly gave birth. James also used his
prerogative powers to dispense with penal laws for Catholics and dissenters, appointed Catholics
to key positions in the army and other offices, and began a purge of municipal officials.83 Using
the courts to challenge local charters and to prosecute his most virulent anti-Catholic subjects for
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treason, James began to assert control over local government.84 If successful at controlling local
government, the king could then influence parliamentary elections and pack the legislative body
with his supporters. Such a course of conduct led James’s Protestant magnates to invite William
of Orange and Mary to deliver the realm from Catholic absolutism.
With the nation’s embrace of William, James tossed the Great Seal into the Thames and
fled to court of Louis XIV. William became the provisional leader of the government upon
James’s “abdication.” He then issued writs for a Convention Parliament to meet to decide the
fate of the Crown. Though there was some support for bringing James back under certain
limitations, James ended this talk when he announced that he would not accept limits on his
royal authority. Because of James’s recalcitrance, William and Mary were offered and accepted
the throne. They also agreed to certain limitations on royal power as enumerated in the English
Bill of Rights.85 The key provisions of the Bill of Rights forbade the monarch from suspending
laws without the consent of Parliament, from using the prerogative power to gain extraparliamentary grants of revenue, and from creating or maintaining standing armies without the
consent of Parliament.86 This acceptance of limited power marked the successful conclusion of
the so-called Glorious Revolution.
The Bill of Rights did not put forth the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy nor did it
disclaim the divine right of kings. But in reality the Glorious Revolution marked the beginning
of parliamentary sovereignty in the Bodin mold. With the monarch unable to raise significant
revenues without parliamentary consent, Parliament effectively assumed control of the ship of
state. What began as an advisory council of great magnates was fast becoming the ultimate
sovereign in the English political system.
In sum, the 1600s was a century of great change and debate. The century began with a
monarch devoted to the divine right of kings and ended with the ignominious flight of his
grandson. The efforts of the Stuarts to rule without Parliament resulted in the demise of their
beloved divine right theory and the weakening of the monarchy. God’s supposed Lieutenant on
earth had lost much of his luster. Although it would be some time before Parliament reduced the
monarch to a mere figurehead, the course steered by the Stuarts accelerated this process.
The instability caused by clashes between the Crown and Parliament in the 1640s
permitted Englishmen to debate the first principles of society and some voices argued for
popular sovereignty to replace divine right theory. Under Leveller theory, departments of
government were but the servants of the omnipotent people. To put theory into practice, the
Levellers created a written constitution called the Agreement of the People. The Agreement was
ahead of its time and offered an alternative to divine right and parliamentary supremacy.
Although England did not ready embrace popular sovereignty, it would not be long until thirteen
English colonies would.
II

Sovereignty and the American Revolution
In the decades prior to the American Revolution, the principle of parliamentary
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sovereignty was well established. Until the American colonists began to rethink the concept
sovereignty in the 1760s, most British subjects at home and abroad agreed on the locus of
sovereignty. Parliament was the bedrock of British liberty—the champion of the people in the
battle against royal absolutism. This stability of parliamentary supremacy promised that the
king would never again challenge Parliament and that the various concepts of sovereignty and
society put forward in the Putney debates during the Civil War would not threaten the status quo.
All was good with the British constitution until the Mother Country developed a renewed interest
in her North American colonies.
A.

Blackstone on Parliamentary Sovereignty

During the 1760s, the place and power of Parliament was memorialized by the great
William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. Parliament, according to
Blackstone, consisted of “the king’s majesty, sitting there in his royal political capacity, and the
three estates of the realm; the lords spiritual, the lords temporal, (who sit, together with the king,
in one house) and the commons, whom sit by themselves in another.”87 The Commentaries thus
recognized that the principle of king-in-parliament was settled. The Stuart proposition that the
Lords and Commons were dispensable was but a part of history. Blackstone was clear that the
“crown cannot begin of itself any alteration in the present established law.”88
Regarding the power of Parliament, Blackstone described it as follows:
It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging,
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning
matters of all profittable denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil military,
maritime, or criminal: this being the place where absolute despotic power, which
must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of
these kingdoms.89
Nor was fundamental law beyond the reach of parliament in Blackstone’s estimation: “It can
change and create afresh even the Constitution of the kingdom. . . .”90 Once Parliament takes an
action regarding the constitution or a lesser matter, “no authority upon earth can undo” it.91
The phrase “no authority” also included the people of Great Britain. Under the accepted
doctrine, if Parliament enacted pernicious laws that threatened the liberty of the people, “the
subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner of remedy.”92 Parliament was not an agent
or trustee of the people and thus subject to their sanction–it was sovereign.93 Blackstone

87

William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *149.
Id. at 150; see also id. at 151 (“Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of
government in a direction different from what either, acting by themselves, would have done. . . .”).
89
Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 157.
93
A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 9 (Liberty Fund 1982) (1882); see also John
V. Jezierski, James Wilson and Blackstone on the Nature and Location of Sovereignty 32 J. Hist. Ideas 95, 103
88

13

specifically took aim at John Locke’s assertion that parliament was “only a fiduciary power to
act for certain ends” and that the people possessed “supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative[] when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them.”94
Blackstone derided Locke’s logic as “theory” and alien to the British constitution as it had
actually developed.95 Without elaboration, he refused to adopt or argue from Locke’s reasoning
and instead affirmed “that the power of parliament is absolute and without control.”96
This absolute power followed British subjects within the empire. As explained during the
Stamp Act crisis by Martin Howard, Jr., “[e]very Englishmen, therefore, is subject to
[Parliament’s] jurisdiction, and it follows him wherever he goes. It is the essence of government,
that there should be a supreme head, and it would be a solecism in politicks to talk of members
independent of it.”97 Thus, the British constitution’s concept of sovereignty applied to the
American colonists as if the colonists resided in London. So long as they resided on soil
controlled by Great Britain, Parliament was their master.
B.

De facto Home Rule

The decades before the American Revolution were dynamic. Between 1750 and 1770
Britain’s North American colonists doubled from 1 million to 2 million.98 With this increase in
population came an increase in the colonies’ value to the mother country. Colonial imports from
Britain rose from a little under £1 million to over £2 million.99 Taking colonial exports into
account, the mother county enjoyed a £500,000 trade surplus with the colonies.100
Although profitability is the main purpose for possession of colonies, there was no master
or centralized plan to achieve this result. The colonies developed naturally on the backs on
enterprising individuals. Britain’s imperial structure was dilapidated and inefficient–certainly
incapable of hindering the growing colonies.101 This neglect of colonial matters left Americans
with a strong sense of self-sufficiency and self-government.102 British officials were seldom in a
position to interfere with colonists’ economic and social pursuits, and the colonists took
advantage of their independence–often to the benefit of the empire. This independence was the
case not just in North America, but throughout the peripheries of the empire. Local bodies in
Wales, Scotland, and Ireland enjoyed an independence that would have been unthinkable under a

(1971) (“In short, Parliament was able to do everything that was not naturally impossible, and what it did no
authority on earth was able to undo.”).
94
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 77-78 (C.B. Macpherson, ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690)
(emphasis omitted).
95
William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *157.
96
Id.
97
Martin Howard, Jr., A Letter From a Gentleman at Halifax (1765), reprinted in Tracts of the American Revolution
67 (Merrill Jensen, ed., Bobs-Merrill Co. 1967) [hereinafter Jensen, Tracts].
98
See Gordon S. Wood, The American Revolution 6 (2002) [hereinafter Wood, American Revolution].
99
Id. at 13.
100
Id. at 15.
101
Id. at 5.
102
Samuel Elliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People 181 (1965).

14

more centralized, European monarchy.103 Such a localization of power was a direct result of
Parliament’s triumph in the Glorious Revolution and the Crown’s inability to raise revenue
without resort to the British Parliament or the representative assemblies of the various
colonies.104
This hands-off approach to the colonies changed with the conclusion of the Seven Years’
War in 1763. The victorious British forces acquired vast new territories from France and Spain
in North America. While the new territory promised to be a great boon for the empire, the cost
of its acquisition was high. The war debt rose to £317 million with £5 million in annual
interest.105 Considering that the empire’s peacetime budget was about £8 million, the debt was
staggering.106 In addition to this preexisting debt, Britain faced the prospect of additional
expenditures in organizing the new territories and appointing royal officials. Britain also faced
the prospect of keeping the peace with hostile Indian tribes that unhappily found themselves
under British jurisdiction. The ever-present colonial hunger for land made conflict inevitable;
therefore, Britain estimated that it would need 10,000 regular troops stationed in North America
to handle the peacekeeping duties.107
The raising of additional revenue was not an easy task. Britons suffered under a heavy
tax burden and many felt that the colonists gained the most benefit from the victory over
France.108 Taxation in Britain had reached upwards of thirty percent of landowners’ incomes
before the Seven Years’ War.109 The British Treasury estimated that the average colonist paid
one-fiftieth of the taxes paid by the average British subject living in the Mother Country.110
Hence, Britons of all classes and parties believed it was time for the colonists to pay something
towards their own defense.111
C.

Imperial Restructuring

The first revenue generating measure passed by Parliament was the Sugar Act of 1764.112
The stated purpose of the Act in its preamble was “defraying the expences of defending,
protecting, and securing” the North American colonies.113 The Sugar Act lowered the duties on
foreign molasses, but increased the duties on various luxury items such as linen, silk, and
wine.114 The increased duties were ill-timed because the North American colonies were
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experiencing a post-war economic downturn.115 A flurry of protests followed as the colonists
realized that the Sugar Act would be but the first of many other parliamentary intrusions on their
independent existence.
The next intervention was the infamous Stamp Act of 1765.116 It was the first direct,
internal tax to be levied on the North American colonies by Parliament.117 The Act required that
almost every form of paper used in the colonies be affixed with an official stamp. Hence, the tax
increased the price of legal documents, almanacs, newspapers, pamphlets, calendars, and
numerous other items used by all classes of colonial society.118 Colonials regarded it with almost
universal odium.
The colonists believed that Stamp Act, if accepted, would create a precedent harmful to
American liberties. The importance of precedent or custom was key to the British constitution.
Because it was unwritten, the British constitution necessarily relied more on custom or precedent
than the current United States Constitution. Precedent certainly carries much weight in the
American system, but those unhappy with precedent may also turn to the Constitution’s text and
history when arguing for the overturn of precedent. With no text and therefore no discussion or
debate prior to adopting the text, British subjects necessarily were limited to the custom of the
realm as evidenced by prior course of conduct. Accordingly, when subjects feared that
Parliament or the king were inserting a dangerous innovation into the constitutional order, they
were duty bound to create a “record” with protests and often refusals to abide by the
unconstitutional act.119 If they failed to do so, a subsequent king or parliament could build
further on the precedent.
The Boston Tea Party–typically treated as a mere tax protest–is a good example of the
importance of precedent. Though the Tea Act of 1773 reduced the price of tea, the colonists felt
compelled to take action to prevent Parliament from setting a revenue precedent. Under
commercial rules, a ship entering a colonial harbor was not permitted to leave without offloading
its cargo. If the tea was offloaded a duty would be paid; if it was not offloaded within twenty
days the cargo would be seized by customs officials who would retain a portion of the
merchandise to satisfy the duty. The Tea Party occurred on the nineteenth day that the ships
bearing tea had been in the harbor. The colonists destroyed to tea so it could not be seized by the
customs officials and the duty technically “paid” to form the basis of a precedent.120 With this
background, one can better understand why the colonists so vehemently opposed the Stamp Act
as the first direct, internal tax levied by Parliament. They simply could not afford for such a tax
to become precedent.
The resolutions and protests from the various colonial assemblies shared a number of
characteristics. First, they pointed to the lack of precedent for Parliament levying direct, internal
taxes on the colonies. In the words of the Maryland assembly:
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his Majestys liege People of this Ancient Province have always enjoyed the Right
of being Governed by Laws to which they themselves have consented in the
Articles of Taxes and internal Polity and that the same hath never been forfeited
or any other way Yielded up but hath been Constantly recognized by the King and
People of Great Britain.121
Often connected to the precedent argument was a “knowledge” argument based on
divergent local circumstances. The Virginia House of Burgesses lectured Parliament that “only
representatives chosen by the people “can . . . know what Taxes the People are able to bear, or
the easiest Method of raising them.”122 Considering the challenges of travel and communications
in the eighteenth century, this was a strong argument. Parliament was attempting to enact
comprehensive, one-size-fits-all tax on colonies as different as South Carolina and Massachusetts
when no member of Parliament was from either colony and very few, if any, had personal
knowledge of the colonial circumstances.
The knowledge problem aside, the colonials also protested that the members of
Parliament levying the tax on the colonies would not feel the pinch of the tax. According to the
Virginia House of Burgesses, this shared burden by elected representatives “is the only Security
against a burthensome Taxation, and the distinguishing Characteristic of British Freedom,
without which the ancient Constitution cannot exist.”123 When legislating for Britain, a member
of Parliament would feel the bite of tax or ill-conceived law in the same manner as electors and
those non-electors who were “virtually represented.” This was not true for American colonists
virtually represented in parliament. Members of Parliament could not feel the effects of laws on
the colonials nor were they present to witness the effects. Thus, the doctrine of shared burdens
proved to be a compelling argument against virtual representation.124
Keying on representation, the colonial assemblies also made the famous taxationwithout-representation argument known by every schoolchild. The phrase “no taxation without
representation,” however, is a bit more complicated than most Americans have been led to
believe. Under the customs of the British constitution, taxation was a gift from the people to the
king and was distinguished from ordinary legislation.125 Because one cannot gift something if
one does not have a claim to it, taxation was closely tied to representation.126 The Connecticut
assembly expressed the ideas as follows:
That in the Opinion of this House, An Act for raising Money by Duties or Taxes
differs from other Acts of Legislation, in that it is always considered as a free Gift
121
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of the People made by their legal, and elected Representatives, And that we
cannot conceive, that the People of great Britain, or their Representatives, have
Right, to dispose of our Property.127
Because the colonists, via the franchise, had authorized no member of Parliament to consent to
taxation, the Stamp Act was void. It followed that colonial “gifts” to the king could only come
from the colonial assemblies. In fact, the colonists through Benjamin Franklin suggested that the
king should approach them directly if he desired revenue: “when aids to the Crown are wanted,
they are to be asked of the several assemblies, according to the old established usage, who will,
as they have always done, grant them freely.”128 The colonists reasoning on this point was
sound, and many Britons, including William Pitt, agreed that Parliament could not tax the
colonies.129
Of course, the colonists’ protests went far beyond respectful resolves and petitions.
Rioters took to the streets and burned sheets of stamps.130 Tax collectors became pariahs and
some were forced to take refuge with British troops.131 Fearing for their lives and lacking faith
in British protection, many of the stamp agents simply resigned.132 Organized extra-legal groups
known as “Sons of Liberty” sprang up across the colonies.133 These organizations persuaded
lawyers, judges, and merchants to carry on their business without using the detested stamps.134
They also carried out a successful campaign to boycott certain British goods.135
The boycott proved so effective that by 1766 London merchants petitioned Parliament for
the repeal of the Stamp Act.136 As discussed earlier, the distinguished William Pitt and his
followers agreed with the Americans’ constitutional complaints regarding taxation and
representation. These factors along with Parliament’s desire to end the violence against stamp
agents led to the repeal of the Stamp Act. However, even those members of Parliament who
joined with the Americans in seeking a repeal of the Act desired to reaffirm the power and
ultimate sovereignty of Parliament. Pitt, in his speech urging repeal, counseled as follows:
At the same time, let the sovereign authority of this country over the colonies be
asserted in as strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every
point of legislation whatsoever. That we may bind their trade, confine their
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manufactures, and exercise every power whatsoever, except that of taking money
out of their pockets without their consent.137
This sentiment would give rise to the Declaratory Act of 1766 in which Parliament
claimed the power “to make all laws and statutes of sufficient force to bind the colonies and
people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever.”138 This
assertion of authority was not radical. With the Declaratory Act, Parliament was simply
acknowledging its place in the constitutional order as established in the Glorious Revolution.
The Declaratory Act, however, caused the colonists to redouble the intellectual efforts in
examining the doctrine of sovereignty.
D.

Rethinking Sovereignty

The American thinkers sought to limit the despotic and absolute power of Parliament.
This was an effort to enshrine principles of home rule in the British constitution.139 Early efforts
to limit parliamentary power proved clumsy and problematic. For example, in 1764, James Otis
published his Rights of the British Colonies in which he argued for continued home rule and
some form of colonial representation in the British Parliament.140 But for home rule to mean
anything, the power of Parliament had to be limited. In his tract, Otis accepted that Parliament
had “an undoubted power and lawful authority to make acts for the general good”141 and that
Parliament’s power was “uncontroulable, but by themselves, and we must obey.”142 At the same
time, Otis argued the power of Parliament was limited by “judgment, righteousness, and truth”
under a natural law formulation prohibiting Parliament from being “absolute and arbitrary.”143
Aside from being contradictory, Otis’s proposed limitation on Parliament was tantamount to a
repeal of the Glorious Revolution. Britons associated parliamentary sovereignty with British
liberty; parliamentary sovereignty was English and later British liberty. Otis’s unworkable and
contradictory theory thus met with few accolades.
Learning from Otis’s mistakes, other thinkers chose to distinguish between the power of
Parliament and the power of colonial assemblies.144 They divided the powers of the colonial
assemblies and that of Parliament into two distinct spheres. The powers of Parliament were
described as external, general, or imperial, while the powers of the assemblies were described as
internal or local. For example, John Dickinson writing in 1768 observed that in an empire
comprised of distinct provinces “there must exist a power somewhere to preside, and preserve
the connection in due order.”145 If the issue concerned the empire as a whole such as the
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regulation of trade among the members, Dickinson opined that the power must rest with
Parliament.146 Direct taxation, however, was an internal matter and therefore outside of
Parliament’s power.147 Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island agreed with Dickinson on this point
and urged his fellow colonists to “patiently submit” to all laws passed by Parliament “for
directing and governing all these general matters.”148 But for matters affecting only one part of
the empire, Hopkins pointed to the “peculiar privileges” of the different provinces as the ultimate
authority.149
The Mother Country understood that it was but a small step from the concept of divided
sovereignty to an argument that Parliament had no sovereign power over the colonies. During
questioning of Benjamin Franklin by Parliament, he was specifically asked whether the colonies
might not soon voice objections to Parliament’s regulation of external matters. Choosing his
words carefully, Franklin responded that while some men had presented that position, the
colonists had yet to be persuaded. However, he ominously warned that “in time they may
possibly be convinced by these arguments.”150
As Franklin predicted, it was not long until the colonists rejected the supremacy of
Parliament. By the late 1760s, the colonists had already become suspicious of parliamentary
sovereignty. In 1768, pamphleteer William Hicks observed that “while the power of the British
parliament is acknowledged sovereign and supreme in every respect whatsoever, the liberty of
America is no more than a flattering dream, and her privileges delusive shadows.”151
Perhaps the best statement of the colonists’ rejection of parliamentary supremacy is
Thomas Jefferson’s A Summary View of the Rights of British America.152 According to
Jefferson’s version of history, the colonists left the Mother Country and only continued the union
with Great Britain “by submitting themselves to the same common sovereign, who was thereby
made the central link connecting the several parts of the empire thus newly multiplied.”153
Hence, the sole connection between the people of Britain and the colonists was George III. To
Jefferson, Parliament was a foreign jurisdiction having no say in the affairs of the colonies.
Jefferson declared a number of parliamentary enactments “void” on the “true ground . . . that the
British parliament has no right to exercise authority over us.”154
Jefferson also offered George III a road map on how to preserve the union between the
people of Britain and the North American colonists. Describing the king as “the only mediatory
power between the several states of the British Empire,” Jefferson asked George III to approach
Parliament to recommend the repeal of unconstitutional acts which were the cause of
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“discontents and jealousies among us.”155 Without intercession of the king, “fraternal love and
harmony through the whole empire” would be impossible.156
In reality, Jefferson’s solution to the dispute between the colonies and Mother Country
was impossible for the British to accept. At the time Jefferson penned his Summary View, the
balance created by the Glorious Revolution was less than 100 years old. Although in 1774 the
balance of power tilted decidedly toward Parliament, the royal prerogative was not yet dead and
the king still exercised substantial power under the British constitution. Were the king to accept
Jefferson’s view of royal power, the constitutional balance would shift away from Parliament
and back toward the king. To a nation wedded to the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and
suspicious of attempts to augment royal power, Jefferson’s proposal was a constitutional heresy.
During this time, there were formal plans of union drafted in a effort to avoid
independence. For example, the loyalist Joseph Galloway proposed a plan that would have
united the thirteen colonies within the British Empire. Galloway called for the creation of
continental assembly that he described as “a British and American legislature” that would
“regulat[e] the administration of the general affairs of America.”157 In theory, this legislature
would be “an inferior and distinct branch of the British legislature” although it would handle all
continental matters.158 Each colony would “retain its present constitution, and all powers of
regulating and governing its own internal police, in all cases what[so]ever.”159 In recognition of
the king’s authority, he was to appoint a president general to execute the laws passed by the new
legislature.160
With George III unwilling to intercede on behalf of the colonies or to accept proposals
for union, the colonies declared independence. Consistent with the colonists’ evolving theory of
sovereignty, the Declaration of Independence primarily addressed the “history of the present
King of Great Britain”161 The Declaration only indirectly addressed Parliament by accusing the
king of “combin[ing] with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution.”162
By 1776, the colonists had jettisoned Parliament from the constitutional scheme. With the king
serving as the only link between the colonists and the British Empire, there was no need to
formerly address Parliament or declare independence from parliamentary rule. Because of the
king’s multiple abuses, the colonies were “absolved from all allegiance[] to the British
crown.”163
The rejection of parliamentary sovereignty and connection with the king left ultimate
sovereignty in each state legislature. Years later James Madison would observe that at the time
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of the Revolution, “[t]he legislative power was maintained to be as complete in each American
Parliament, as in the British Parliament.”164 Of course, some Americans were questioning
whether an artificial body such as legislature could possess ultimate sovereignty. According to
the General Court of Massachusetts:
It is a maxim, that, in every government, there must exist, somewhere, a supreme,
sovereign, absolute, and uncontroulable power; But this power resides always in
the body of the people, and it never was, or can be delegated, to one man, or a
few; the great Creator, having never given to men a right to vest others with
authority over them, unlimited, either in duration or degree.165
In other words, the people possess what Bodin or Blackstone would recognize as ultimate
sovereignty, while the people’s agents (e.g., representatives, governors, and judges) possess what
we today call governmental or legislative sovereignty, which is derived from the people and is
inferior to the people’s ultimate sovereignty.166
On the state level, these principles of sovereignty were enshrined in state constitutions
and bills of rights. For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights declared that “all power is
vested in, and consequently derived from, the People; that magistrates are their trustees and
servants, and at all times amenable to them.”167 On the continental level, the issue of sovereignty
did not pose a problem under the Articles of Confederation because Congress’s power did not
extend to individuals. For example, Congress could not tax citizens; it could only make
requisitions of the state governments.
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Issues of sovereignty, however, arose again with the Constitution of 1787. After
compromise, study, and debate, the Framers created a system in which the people of each state
delegated power to two governmental sovereigns: the state and national governments. “The
Federal and State Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,”
Madison wrote in Federalist No. 46, “instituted with different powers, and designated for
different purposes.”168 By ratifying the Constitution in separate state conventions, the people of
each state took a portion of the powers originally delegated to their state governments and
transferred this power to the national government. The powers possessed by the state
governments, and not affected by the grant to the national government, remained with the state
governments.
Using terms familiar to the revolutionary generation, Madison differentiated between the
powers of the national and state governments. “The former will be exercised principally on
external objects, as war, peace, negociation, and foreign commerce,” while those of the latter
“will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.”169
In other words, Americans established a de jure federal union. Such a union had existed
de facto in the British Empire until the imperial reorganization of the 1760s when Britain
attempted to curtail some of the privileges of home rule enjoyed by the colonists. The distinction
argued for between external matters controlled by the empire and internal matters controlled by
colonial–now state–assemblies was enshrined into America’s fundamental law. In this sense the
American Revolution was a true revolution. The wheel began in a position recognizing the
federal nature of the British Empire, was pushed forward by British agents of imperial
reorganization, and was eventually returned to its initial federal position by the American
colonists via insurrection.
Interestingly, the American understanding of popular sovereignty was eventually
enshrined in Blackstone’s Commentaries--albeit in St. George Tucker’s 1803 annotated version
of the Commentaries. Tucker was the preeminent legal theorist of the early 1800s. His annotated
edition of the Commentaries was the definitive American legal text used in the first half of the
nineteenth century. In his Appendix A to the first volume of the Commentaries, Tucker made
clear that British concept of sovereignty did not survive the American Revolution. Tucker
described the people as possessing “indefinite and unlimited power.”170 If a mere legislature
exceeded a grant of power found in a constitution, Tucker stated that the resulting statute
offended “against a greater power from whom all authority, among us, is derived” and that the
offending act should be opposed.171 With such annotations, Tucker attempted to render
Blackstone useable for American lawyers brought up in the republican tradition.
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III. Royal Courts and Sovereignty
Thus far the development of the theory of sovereignty is primarily characterized as a
struggle between the king and Parliament in England and between king-in-parliament and the
colonial assemblies in America (with the “sovereign” people of each state/colony brought into
the fray early on in the American Revolution). Noticeably absent from the front lines are courts
of law, those institutions that today in America have the final say on the meaning of fundamental
law.
In understanding the absence of court power, we must remember that English judges
were appointed by the king and served at his pleasure.172 If the king disagreed with a decision of
a judge, the judge could be dismissed immediately. The king was the font of all justice and the
judges were his agents. In the words of James I, “[a]s kings borrow their power from God, so
judges from kings; and as kings are to account to God, so judges unto God and kings.”173 If the
judges were presented with a question concerning the king’s prerogative, James instructed them
to “deal not with it till you consult with the king or his Council.”174 Lacking independence, the
judges were not in a position to interject themselves into disputes between the king and
Parliament concerning the locus of ultimate sovereignty.
Of course, some intrepid judges sympathetic to parliamentary power did challenge the
king on occasion. For example, Sir Edward Coke had several confrontations with James I. Coke
was a giant of the common law with a legal career that spanned three reigns. He served as
attorney general for Queen Elizabeth, chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas and later the
Court of King’s Bench during James I’s reign, and a leader in Parliament during the reign of
Charles I.175 A brilliant thinker, Coke is credited with outlining the principles that have become
modern law.176 Although ahead of his time, it is a mistake to view Coke’s efforts out of context
and credit him with establishing an early form of judicial review.
A.

Prohibitions del Roy

Perhaps Coke’s most celebrated clash with James I occurred during the case entitled
Prohibitions del Roy, which dealt with use of a writ of prohibition.177 A writ of prohibition was
a process whereby high court judges could stay the proceedings of inferior courts.178 The writ
was more than an affront to an inferior court’s jurisdiction; it also had monetary implications for
the judges. Judges depended on fees generated by litigation for their incomes.179 Thus, judges
were eager to hear numerous cases and especially those involving real property, which promised
the most lucrative fees.180
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The case of Prohibitions del Roy concerned the issue of payment of tithes over which the
Ecclesiastical courts claimed jurisdiction.181 The Archbishop of Canterbury complained to
James about Coke’s use of the writ of prohibition in tithe cases and the king took up the matter
with his chief justice. The king averred that he “himself may decide [cases] in his royal person,
and that judges are but the delegates of the king, and that the king may take what causes he shall
please to determine from the determination of the judges, and may determine them himself.”182
While Coke agreed that the king is always present in court, he denied that a king could actually
sit in judgment outside the king’s position as chief justice of the House of Lords.183 Coke further
observed that the king lacked the requisite learning in the law to serve as a judge outside the
House of Lords.184 When the king became angry and asked if Coke meant to put him under law,
Coke responded by quoting Bracton “quod rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege”
(that the king was under no man, but under God and the law).185 James took umbrage at the
remark, reportedly flying into a rage and threatening to strike Coke.186 Fearing the king’s wrath,
Coke fell to his knees and begged James for forgiveness.187
Dissatisfied with Coke’s independent streak, James transferred Coke from the office of
chief justice of Common Pleas to chief justice of King’s Bench.188 This was a “promotion” in
status but adversely affected Coke’s financial position because the litigation in King’s Bench
brought in lesser fees.189 At King’s Bench, Coke continued to anger James by refusing to
postpone certain hearings so the king could “consult” with his judges.190 Eventually, the king
ended Coke’s judicial career by dismissing him from King’s Bench.191 Coke was then elected to
Parliament where he continued to oppose the king. In 1621, Coke was imprisoned in the Tower
of London for his zeal in impeaching state officers.
While there was a boldness to Coke’s actions as a judge, this boldness should not be
overstated. The courts were hardly a check on the king’s power as evidenced by Coke’s
prostration before the king and his demotion to, and dismissal from, King’s Bench. Judges were
agents of the Crown; they were not an independent branch of government meant to limit royal
authority.192 A system with despotic power residing in a king--by its very nature--must reject the
power of courts to review or overturn pronouncements of law.
B.

Dr. Bonham’s Case

Much has also been made of Coke’s supposed judicial limitations on Parliament’s power.
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In support of this, scholars cite193 to Coke’s opinion in Dr. Bonham’s Case194 in which Coke
stated that “when an act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such act to be
void.”195 Taken out of context, this statement sounds much akin to the modern concept of
judicial review with which American lawyers are familiar.
Dr. Bonham’s Case arose out of a dispute between Dr. Thomas Bonham and the Royal
College of Physicians. Pursuant to a charter granted by Henry VII that was later confirmed by an
act of Parliament,196 the college was authorized to (1) fine persons practicing medicine in
London without a license from the college, (2) govern London’s medical community, and (3)
fine and imprison those guilty of malpractice.197 The president and censors of the college were
permitted to retain half of the money they received for fines imposed.198 As a royal creation, the
college was closely tied to the monarchy and its power often increased and diminished along
with the monarch’s.199 After a period of dormancy, the college began to exercise its
prosecutorial and judicial powers in the late 1500s and early 1600s.200
In 1605, Dr. Bonham attempted to join the college, but the membership rejected him.201
Despite a warning from the college, Bonham continued to practice medicine in London.202 For
his intransigence, Bonham was fined and imprisoned. The Court of Common Pleas, over which
Coke presided, released him within a week on a writ of habeas corpus.203 Annoyed at Coke’s
actions, royal officials and several judges met at Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s home and
encouraged the college to sue Bonham in the Court of King’s Bench.204 Following this advice,
the college sued Dr. Bonham in King’s Bench seeking T60 in fines for illicit practice.205
Tellingly, the attorney general rather than the college’s attorney handled the case.206 Bonham
filed his own suit in Common Pleas seeking £100 for false imprisonment.207
While the case in Common Pleas was pending, King’s Bench ruled in favor of the college
and imprisoned Dr. Bonham for his inability to pay the fine.208 One year later, Coke ruled in
favor of Dr. Bonham and ordered him released. Coke detested anti-competitive monopolies such
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as that possessed by the College.209 Construing the college’s royal charter narrowly, Coke ruled
that the College could fine a person for illicit practice, but it could only imprison for
malpractice.210 Further, to the extent that the college could be a judge and party to a case via its
judicial powers, Coke construed the clause as an absurdity. Right before his famous statement
about common right and reason, Coke noted that “censors cannot be judges, ministers, and
parties; judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; and parties to have the
moiety of the forfeiture.”211 In other words, he was merely exercising a cannon of statutory
interpretation whereby a statute contradicting established legal principles is narrowly construed
so the result is not absurd (because Parliament, in its wisdom, could not have intended an absurd
result).212 This is exactly how Blackstone read the holding in Dr. Bonham’s Case:
[A]cts of parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity; and if
there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly
contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to the collateral
consequences, void. . . . But where some collateral matter arises out of the general
words, and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to
conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore
they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard
it. Thus, if an act of parliament gives a man power to try all causes, that arise
within his manor of Dale; yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is a
party, the act is construed not to extend to that; because it is unreasonable that any
man should determine his own quarrel. But, if we could conceive it possible for
the parliament to enact, that he should try as well his own causes as those of other
persons, there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature,
when couched in such evident and express words, as leaves no doubt whether it
was the intent of the legislature to do so.213
Such an interpretation of Dr. Bonham’s Case also makes sense in light of Coke’s
championing the power of Parliament. For example, Coke was a driving force behind the
Petition of Right in 1628 which served as an indictment of the Stuart monarchy and its efforts to
rule by royal prerogative. The Petition obligated the king not to tax without the consent of
Parliament, not to arbitrarily imprison subjects without a showing of just cause, not to billet
soldiers on civilians without their consent, and not to use martial law against civilians.214 In the
1620s Coke also angered the king when he chaired Parliament’s Committee of Grievances that
investigated grants of monopoly and patents such as that possessed by the Royal College in Dr.
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Bonham’s Case.215 Moreover, in his Institutes, which was a comprehensive study of English
law, Coke described the power of Parliament to pass statutes as “so transcendent and absolute”
that “it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds.”216
Considering Coke’s efforts to limit the monarch’s power and to enhance Parliament’s
power, it is unlikely he sought to give judges the power to strike Parliament’s statutes via judicial
review in Dr. Bonham’s Case. Because the judges served at the pleasure of the king and were
part of the executive branch, judicial review would have weakened Parliament and augmented
the power of the king. This certainly was not Coke’s intention. As Harold Cook has observed,
with Dr. Bonham’s Case, Coke “meant to overturn a royal patent when it seemed unjust rather
than to argue for common law jurisdiction over Acts of Parliament.”217
IV.

American Courts and Sovereignty

The power of colonial and early American courts followed the pattern set in Britain.
Theories of parliamentary/legislative sovereignty ensured that courts remained incapable of
limiting the power of the sovereign. The rise of popular sovereignty, however, brought a new
function for the courts: the power of judicial review. Over time, judicial review metamorphosed
into the judicial supremacy enjoyed by the United States Supreme Court and its state court
counterparts. The question remains whether judicial supremacy was a natural development
stemming from judicial review or whether it represents a much older view of sovereignty.
A.

The Judiciary in Early America

Americans recognized the danger presented by a judiciary dependent upon the monarch.
In England, the 1701 Act of Settlement had granted English judges tenure during “good
behavior”–judges were no longer removable at the whim of the king. The Act of Settlement,
however, did not extend to the colonies. Thus, the colonists complained in the Declaration of
Independence that the king “has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.”218
Of course, complaints about abuses from the executive branch extended much further
than the judiciary. For example, colonial governors attempted to influence the colonial
assemblies by appointing legislators to judicial and other offices and by offering legislators
government contracts and other opportunities for personal profit.219 If the legislators were not
compliant with the governor’s wishes, the governor could always remove the benefit bestowed.
For example, during the Stamp Act crisis, the governor of Massachusetts took away
commissions from officers in the state militia who also served in the legislature as punishment
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for their opposition to British policy.220
To remedy these abuses, early American constitutions reduced the power of the executive
branch and increased that of the legislature–the one branch of government most closely
connected with the people.221 The governors’ terms were limited and many state legislatures
began to exercise what had been, and are recognized today, as executive functions (e.g.,
declaring war or pardoning persons convicted of crimes).222 In ten of the newly independent
states the executive was appointed by the legislature and in only two states could the executive
serve more than one year.223 In only four states did the executive enjoy the power of
appointment–the remaining nine lodged the power in the legislature.224 Although today we
associate some sort of veto power with the executive branch, in the early constitutions only three
states granted the executive this power.225 Hence, via term limits, legislative control, and
reduction in executive functions, the people sought to prevent the abuse they had suffered under
royal governors.
The grievances against the king and royal governors did not translate immediately into
establishment of the state judiciaries as independent, co-equal branches of government. For
example, in South Carolina and New Jersey the judiciary was not considered as a separate and
autonomous branch of government.226 At first blush, such arrangements seem to violate basic
separation of powers principles. Today, we recognize three general governmental functions: the
making of laws, the execution of laws, and the application/interpretation of the laws as they
relate to cases and controversies.227 As stated above, for many years in England the judicial
power was considered a branch of the executive department, and this view was accepted by some
American thinkers.228 However, the trend was to view government power as divided into three
separate branches so that, in Jefferson’s words, “no person should exercise the powers of more
than one of them at the same time.”229 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 stated the
predominant view as follows:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the
end it may be a government of laws and not of men.230
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While to modern Americans such sentiments seem to compel the creation of a separate
and distinct judicial branch with the power of judicial review, this was not the understanding at
the time of independence. In the rush to weaken the executive branch (which to some colonists
would include the judicial231), the Americans realized that the legislature could violate its
delegated powers. But to protect themselves from unconstitutional enactments, the people did
not look to the courts. Instead, the people believed that the best security would be internal
safeguards such as bicameralism, delaying veto, term limits, frequent elections, and juries.232
And while not all of these safeguards appeared in each state constitution, some combination of
them did.
Moreover, as pointed out by historian Gordon Wood, “the early constitution-makers had
little sense that judicial independence meant independence from the people.”233 Juries were
especially sacrosanct bodies and could not be overridden by a judge even if the judge believed
the jury’s decision was against the greater weight of the evidence.234 Juries in pre-revolutionary
America possessed virtually unlimited power to determine both law and fact.235 Judges were
often relegated to deciding pretrial motions and other ministerial matters.236 In Georgia, for
example, the juries of the county superior courts decided issues of law and fact, turning to judges
only when they desired advice.237 Decisions of the superior courts could be appealed to special
juries, not a supreme court.238 By placing such power in juries, the community could control the
content of substantive law. A legislature could pass a statute and a judge could instruct on the
common law, but juries possessed the power to veto both.
Similarly, the people did not trust judges to rule on the constitutionality of legislation.239
Juries implicitly possessed this power and some states also employed councils of revision to
determine whether the legislature had deviated from its delegated powers. In Pennsylvania, the
council of censors, which served as a council of revision, was chosen every seven years by the
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people.240 Based on a vote of two-thirds of the censors, a state constitutional convention could
be summoned to correct constitutional abuses or mistakes.241 Popular control of the judiciary was
also evident in states requiring judges to stand for reelection,242 and states that permitted judges
to serve for good behavior often gave the legislature control over judicial salaries and provided
for simple procedures to remove judges.243
B.

The Judiciary at the Philadelphia Convention

By 1787, most Americans agreed that the judiciary should be a separate and independent
branch of government; therefore, the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention insisted on an
independent judiciary. Blackstone had taught that the “distinct and separate existence of the
judicial power, in a particular body of men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by
the crown, consists on main preservative of the public liberty.”244 Accordingly, the ninth
resolution of the Virginia Plan called for creation of a national judiciary with judges holding
office “during good behavior” and prohibiting increases or diminutions in salary “made so as to
affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase of diminution.”245 On the motion
of Gouverneur Morris, the delegates struck the language prohibiting the increase in salaries.246
Benjamin Franklin observed that the possibility of inflation or increased judicial duties counseled
in favor of the authority to increase the pay of judges.247 The motion passed with only Virginia
and North Carolina voting against it.248 Thus, the Framers created a judiciary independent of the
other two branches.
Judicial review, a subject of much debate today, was barley mentioned at the Convention.
Most of the debate regarding the judiciary centered on who would choose the judges: Congress,
the Senate, the president, or some combination thereof. The few references we do have to
judicial review are in connection with a proposed council of revision. The eighth resolution of
the Virginia Plan recommended that the executive and “a convenient number of the National
Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the
National Legislature before it shall operate.”249
After the delegates agreed to a single executive, they turned to the proposed council of
revision. Elbridge Gerry objected to the inclusion of the judiciary in the council because “they
will have a sufficient check against encroachments on their own department by their exposition
of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality.” Gerry continued by
observing that “[i]n some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being against the
240
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Constitution. This was done too with general approbation.”250
Gerry feared that the proposed council of revision would establish judges “as the
guardians of the Rights of the people”–a dangerous proposition in his view.251 To protect the
rights of the people, he preferred to rely “on the Representatives of the people as the guardians of
their Rights & interests.”252 Gerry’s rejection of a guardianship role for courts coupled with his
earlier comments about a check on encroachments “on their own department” indicate a narrow
notion of judicial review. For example, laws limiting rights to jury trial would come within the
scope of the judicial department and the judges could presumably rule on the laws’
constitutionality. But it is unclear whether this power of review would be permissible for
statutes dealing with other matters such as laws establishing qualifications for electors. While
Gerry’s words indicate a narrow understanding of judicial review, there is not enough evidence
to draw a conclusion one way or the other.
Luther Martin echoed Gerry’s broad sentiments that judges–separate and distinct from
the council–had the power to rule on the constitutionality of laws, but Martin made no distinction
about their own department. “In this character” (as judicial officials), Martin noted, “they will
have a negative on the laws.”253
Rufus King agreed with Gerry’s misgivings about composition of the council and cited
separation of powers concerns. “Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come to
them,” King averred, “free from the bias of having participated in its formation.”254 Madison
countered that participation in the council would “enable the Judiciary Department the better to
defend itself against Legislative encroachments” while at the same time shoring up the
executive.255 Judicial self-defense, like Gerry’s statements about the judicial department, also
hint at a narrower understanding of judicial review with judges exercising this power to defend
their constitutional functions.
Madison believed that the additional check in the council was needed because of the
“tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex.”256 He also argued that a veto in
any branch other than the legislative violated pure separation of powers principles, and thus the
separation of powers was not a valid objection to the judges’ participation in the council. George
Mason agreed with Madison, noting that “[t]he Executive power ought to be well secured against
Legislative usurpations on it.”257 He also observed the when ruling from the bench judges “could
impede in one case only, the operation of law.”258 Sitting on the council, judges could have a say
on every unjust law and effect more than just a single case.
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina supported Madison and Mason on judicial inclusion
in the council. Articulating a sweeping understanding of judicial review, he noted that “[t]he
judiciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstrating against projected encroachments on the
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people as well as themselves.”259 He recognized that in interpreting laws the judges “would have
an opportunity of defending their constitutional rights.” But, in his opinion, this was not enough.
“Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive[],”Williamson
observed, “and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give
them effect.”260 Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut also spoke in favor of the judicial inclusion,
noting that it would give more “firmness to the Executive” and it would give an additional
opportunity for the judiciary to defend itself.261
Despite forceful arguments for creating a council of revision composed of judges and the
executive, the eighth resolution of the Virginia Plan was defeated. The debate is instructive on
the delegates’ views on the judiciary. Without question, the delegates offering opinions on the
matter seemed to have contemplated a form judicial review.262 When deciding an actual case or
controversy, they expected the judges to strike unconstitutional laws. The purpose of this power
was two-fold: (1) for the judges to defend their constitutional sphere, and (2) for the judges to
defend the rights of the people. But defense of the people should not be overstated. For instance,
although Gerry applauded judicial review, he made clear that representatives were better
defenders of the people’s liberties and his comments contemplated the judiciary defending their
constitutional prerogatives rather than striking all sorts of legislative enactments. Most likely the
idea of frequent elections played into Gerry’s thinking here.
In setting boundaries of judicial review, Hugh Williamson articulated what we know as
the doubtful case rule.263 A court should not negative an act of the legislature unless the act is a
blatant violation of the Constitution. If there is any doubt about the legitimacy of a statute, it
should be resolved in favor of the people’s representatives by permitting the law to stand. Close
calls are not the business of the judiciary. Williamson’s remarks indicate that the Framers had
some understanding of the threat of “judicial activism” and expected the judiciary to exercise
power in modest fashion.
Discussion of judicial review is also found in debates regarding state veto. The sixth
resolve of the Virginia Plan gave Congress a veto on “all laws passed by the several States
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.”264 On the motion
of Benjamin Franklin, the delegates added to the end of the clause “or any treaties subsisting
under the authority of the Union.”265 Charles Pinckney of South Carolina wanted to broaden the
veto power to all state laws that Congress believed to be improper.”266 Madison seconded the
motion, noting that such a veto was “absolutely necessary to a perfect system.”267 Madison
feared that without a legislative veto “the only remedy will lie in an appeal to coercion.”268
Gerry and others opposed this measure, observing that a national government with such a power
259
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“may enslave the States.”269 Gouverneur Morris feared that the proposed negative “would
disgust all the States.”270 Morris believed that the proposal was also unnecessary because an
unconstitutional law would “be set aside in the Judiciary department.”271 Pinckney’s motion
ultimately failed by the vote of seven states to three.
Upon the rejection of the proposed negative, Luther Martin of Maryland suggested a
supremacy clause:
that the Legislative acts of the U.S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the
articles of Union, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of
the U. S. shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those
acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and
inhabitants–& that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the
individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.272
This was clearly meant as an alternative to the negative and there was very little debate on the
clause. The committee of detail changed Martin’s phraseology from “the Judiciaries of the
several States” to “the judges in the several States.”273 This excluded juries from the supremacy
clause and made clear that the clause applied to national as well as state judges.274 The
committee made other revisions including changing “supreme law of the respective states” to
“supreme law of the land.”275 Without question, the supremacy clause contemplated federal and
state judges reviewing the constitutionality of legislative enactments because they were bound by
“the supreme law of the land.” The Constitution required them to exercise judgment on just
what constituted supreme law and thus contemplated judicial review.
After the Philadelphia Convention, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 offered a
defense of the power of judicial review under the proposed Constitution. Hamilton began with
the proposition that an act contrary to Congress’s enumerated powers is void.276 Hamilton
viewed the people as the ultimate sovereigns who would be expressing their will by adopting the
Constitution.277 The people’s Constitution would thus be superior to statutory law.278 If
Congress could pass a law outside of its delegated powers, Hamilton reasoned, this would
“affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal.”279
Hamilton focused on the fact that the proposed Constitution placed written limits on
government power, something unknown under the British constitution.280 These limitations, he
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argued, could be preserved only in “the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void.”281 To Hamilton, courts served as an
“intermediate body between the people and the legislature . . . to keep the latter within in the
limits assigned to their authority.”282 This judicial power did not place the judiciary above the
legislature, Hamilton averred, but rather put the people above both.283
In sum, the approval of judicial review as expressed by many delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention is consistent with the evolution of sovereignty in American thinking.
Under the British constitution, Parliament could make or unmake any law as it saw fit. Although
courts interpreted parliamentary enactments, a court could not declare an act of Parliament void.
By 1787 in America, most agreed that the people possessed ultimate sovereignty. Hence, the
delegates understood that the courts would play a role unknown to the British system. No longer
did a particular branch of government hold ultimate power. Certainly the legislative branch
predominated, but with a written Constitution all three branches were charged with interpreting
the document. Hence, a form of judicial review was a natural outcome of the Revolution and
was expected by the Philadelphia delegates.
C.

Early Exercises of Judicial Review

The American theory of sovereignty and the arguments of the delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention support the idea of judicial review. Debates and theory, however, are
no substitute for an examination of actual practice in American courts during these formative
years. The decision whether to exercise judicial review ultimately rested with the courts. Early
state court decisions are especially instructive on the evolution of the idea of judicial review.
These decisions demonstrate how judges struggled with the exercise of judicial review in light of
their education and experience with parliamentary sovereignty. Accordingly, what follows is an
examination of early state case law in which a court, or a judge of the court, discussed the
doctrine of judicial review or exercised judicial review.284
These cases provide needed
background to the famous Marbury decision and place the decision and its reasoning in proper
historical context.
Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782)285

1.
Delegates.

286

Caton dealt with a pardon granted to three loyalists by the Virginia House of
Under Virginia’s Treason Act of 1776, the power of pardon in such cases was

281

Id.
Id. at 395.
283
Id.
284
Not included in this discussion are opinions that offered little or no analysis for their actions. For a
comprehensive discussion of early state exercises of judicial review, see William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review
in State Courts Before Marbury (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). The reason for so few
decisions likely rests with the fact that very judges actually wrote opinion in the 1780s and because juries typically
exercised the power to strike a law See Ritz, supra note 235, at 30 & 36.
285
For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to the Westlaw citation: 1782 WL 5 (Va. Nov. 1782).
286
Id. at *1.
282

35

transferred from the executive to the legislature.287 In Caton, the house granted the pardon for
the prisoners and referred the matter to the senate for concurrence. The senate, however, thought
the prisoners unworthy of clemency and voted to deny a pardon.288
The prisoners filed a petition arguing that although the Treason Act referred to “the
general assembly,” the Virginia Constitution in certain cases vested the power to pardon in the
house and that this was in fact such a case.289 Because the state constitution must control the
issuance of a pardon, the prisoners argued that the Treason Act was void.290 The attorney
general countered that the provisions of the state constitution did not run counter to the Treason
Act; as a validly enacted statute the Treason Act controlled and the putative pardon was invalid
because the upper house had failed to concur.291
Judge George Wythe, who would later be a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention,
began by noting that it was his duty to protect the senate and the community against usurpations
from the house.292 In dealing with the other branches, Wythe promised to inform them that “here
is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further.”293 Wythe ultimately
concluded that the state constitution permitted the house to issue pardons without consent of the
senate only in cases of impeachment prosecuted by the house.294 Because this was not an
impeachment case, the house’s pardon of the loyalists was insufficient.
Writing separately, Edmund Pendleton remarked that Virginia was different from the
countries of Europe because it had a written constitution adopted by its citizens as “their social
compact.”295 Pendleton believed that the separation of powers found in the Virginia Constitution
required each branch of government to stay within its delegated powers.296 For Pendleton, this
separation of powers brought into question judicial review, and he was less cavalier than Judge
Wythe in touting the power of the judiciary:
But how far this court, in whom the judiciary powers may be in some sort said to
be concentrated, shall have power to declare the nullity of a law passed in its
forms by the legislative power, without exercising the power of that branch,
contrary to the plain terms of that constitution, is indeed a deep, important, and I
will add, tremendous question. . . . I am happy in being of opinion there is no
occasion to consider it upon this occasion; and still more happy in the hope that
the wisdom and prudence of the legislature will prevent the disagreeable necessity
of ever deciding it, by suggesting the propriety of making the principles of the
constitution the great rule to direct the spirit of the laws.297
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Pendleton ultimately agreed with Wythe’s interpretation of the constitution and Treason Act.
Hence, he found that the pardon was invalid.298 This view carried the day by a vote of six judges
to two.299
Although Caton does not provide a great deal of analysis and any statement on the power
of courts to strike an act of the legislature is dicta, the Pendleton and Wythe opinions are
valuable because of their pioneering nature. Wythe believed that the judiciary had the power to
instruct the other two branches on the scope of their powers—something unheard of under the
British constitution. He also thought it his duty as a judge to protect both the people and the
other branches of government from encroachments. While Wythe obviously rejected the British
doctrine that only the legislature can interpret the constitution, he did not discuss the scope of
judicial review.
In contrast to Wythe’s opinion, Pendleton approached judicial review much more
cautiously. Pendleton recognized that the court was entering uncharted waters and understood
that when declaring a statute unconstitutional a court was arguably taking on a legislative
function in violation of the Virginia constitution. Although not ruling judicial review out of
bounds, he preferred to save the issue for the proper case or controversy.
2.

Rutgers v. Waddington (1784)300

Rutgers involved a challenge to a New York statute known as the Trespass Act.301 Its
purpose was to assist property owners who had fled New York during the Revolution because of
the British occupation.302 In essence, the statute authorized the owners, whose property had been
confiscated and used by the British, to file trespass actions for compensation.303 The Trespass
Act specifically prohibited the pleading of military orders as a defense to suit.304
In 1776, Elizabeth Rutgers fled New York and her brew house located on Maiden
Lane.305 Her abandoned property was confiscated for the use of the army by the British
commissary and given to Benjamin Waddington and Evelyn Pierrepont.306 They enjoyed the
rent-free use of the property until May 1, 1780, when the British commander decreed that they
pay £150 per year to the Vestry for the Poor.307 On June 20, 1783, the British commander
ordered them to pay rent to Rutgers’s agent retroactive to May 1, 1783.308 In the winter of 1783
a fire broke out and destroyed the brewery.309 Pursuant to the Trespass Act, Rutgers brought suit
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for £8000 back rent.
Alexander Hamilton represented Waddington and Pierrepont. He argued that the
Trespass Act was inconsistent with settled principles of the law of nations (i.e., a conqueror has
the right to use property under the conqueror’s control) which had been incorporated into the
New York Constitution, and that the Act was violative of provisions of the Treaty of Paris
waiving private damages “in consequence of or in any wise relating to the war.”310 In briefing
the issues, Hamilton cited to Dr. Bonham’s Case, arguing that “[a] statute against Law and
reason especially if a private statute is void.”311 In later briefs, Hamilton argued that the result
would be the same even if “the legislature intended the results of the Act.”312 Hence, it appears
Hamilton rejected Blackstone’s explanation of Dr. Bonham’s Case as a mere exercise of the
cannons of statutory interpretation whereby a statute contradicting established legal principles is
narrowly construed so the result is not absurd.
Judge James Duane issued a carefully crafted opinion holding that the Trespass Act
should not be interpreted to interfere with the law of nations. In essence, he split the baby by
holding that the law of nations served as a defense when considering orders of the British
commander, but not officials of the British commissary.313 Rutgers could recover damages for
the years 1777 to 1780 (when the property was held pursuant to the commissary’s orders), but
not 1780 forward (when the property was held pursuant to the commander’s orders). He rejected
the treaty argument in toto.314
Regarding judicial review, Judge Duane declined to adopt Hamilton’s broad arguments
about the power of courts to strike a legislative enactment as against law and reason. Relying on
Blackstone, Judge Duane did not challenge legislative supremacy:
The supremacy of the Legislative need not be called into question; if they think fit
positively to enact a law, there is no power which can controul them. When the
main object of such a law is clearly expressed, and the intention manifest, the
judges are not at liberty, altho’ it appears unreasonable, to reject it: for this were
to set the judicial above the legislative, which would be subversive of all
government.315
Like Blackstone, Judge Duane observed that judges could resort to equity in expounding
a statute when it is clear that absurd consequences were not foreseen by the legislature.316 This,
however, effectuated the intent of the legislature and did not result in judicial ascendancy.317
Armed with the cannons of statutory construction, Judge Duane ruled that the legislature could
not have intended to repeal the law of nations with the Trespass Act; therefore, orders of the
British commander provided a defense.
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Judge Duane’s exercised some legal gymnastics to reach this result. He also likely faced
political pressure as evidenced by an open letter in the New York Packet and American
Advertiser. In this letter published after the Rutgers decision, Melancton Smith and other
influential New Yorkers noted that a power in the courts to control the legislature would be
“absurd in itself.”318 The job of the courts, the letter lectured, was “to declare the laws, not to
alter them.”319 If courts struck an act of the legislature, they violated principles of separation of
powers and endangered the liberties of the people.320 In addition to Smith and his followers,
Duane’s efforts at statutory construction also earned him a rebuke from the legislature and the
threat of impeachment—the legislature did not agree that the words of the statute yielded an
absurd result.321
The threats and stinging criticism of Duane’s opinion, however, seem misplaced because
he did not strike down a statute nor did he claim such a power. The Rutgers opinion was true to
Blackstone and American respect for the legislative branch; Judge Duane did not accept
Hamilton’s theory of judicial review. Judge’s Duane statutory construction did defeat the
purpose of full compensation for patriots and thus started a political firestorm. This firestorm
revealed much distrust of judicial power and the preference for legislative power. New Yorkers
were not yet ready to expand the power of their courts.
3.

Trevett v. Weeden (1786)322

Trevett arose out of legislation passed by the Rhode Island General Assembly authorizing
the issuance of paper money.323 To compel acceptance of the paper, the General Assembly
passed a Forcing Act that levied fines on persons refusing to accept paper and persons
contributing to the depreciation of the paper currency’s value.324 Violators could be tried without
a jury in special court and had no right to appeal.325 Weeden violated the paper money statute
when he refused to accept paper currency from John Trevett.326 Rather than apply to a special
court, Trevett complained to the superior court of judicature (the highest court in the state) which
heard arguments on September 22, 1786.327
Weeden challenged the statutory scheme on three grounds: (1) early expiration of the
statute because of a drafting error, (2) denial of appellate rights, and (3) denial of the right to a
jury trial.328 Weeden specifically argued that the court could strike the law as unconstitutional
because “‘the Legislature derives all its authority from the constitution—has no power of making
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laws but in subordination to it—cannot infringe or violate it.’”329 The Court ultimately
dismissed the complaint against Weeden because the action was not brought in a special court as
commanded by statute.330 In so holding, the court observed that the “complaint does not come
under cognizance of the Justices here present, and . . . it is hereby dismissed.”331
The General Assembly, however, interpreted the court’s decision otherwise and
demanded that the judges appear to explain their reasons for declaring “‘an act of the supreme
legislature of this state to be unconstitutional, and so absolutely void.’”332 Judges David Howell,
Joseph Hazard, and Thomas Tillinghast appeared to explain their decision.333 In his speech,
Judge Howell denied that the court struck the statute as unconstitutional, but nonetheless stated
that it was his personal opinion that it was unconstitutional.334 Even with this clarification, the
legislature considered dismissing the judges from office but eventually relented.335 The
legislature did not forget Judge Howell’s speech favoring judicial review and at the expiration of
the judges’ terms of office the next year, the legislature declined to reelect four of the five
involved in the Trevett case.336
Although the Rhode Island judges did not exercise the power of judicial review, counsel
for Weeden urged the court to exercise such a power. Had the case been brought in the proper
court, Judge Howell indicated that he believed that the statute in question was unconstitutional.
The legislature showed its adherence to principles of legislative supremacy when it demanded
that the judges appear to defend their rulings and later when it dismissed four of the five judges
even though they had not exercised judicial review. Rhode Island, like New York with the
Rutgers case, was not prepared to accept expansion of the judiciary’s power.
4.

Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart) 5 (1787)337

Bayard dealt with title to property that had been confiscated in the Revolutionary War.338
By statute, the North Carolina legislature directed that claims to such property were to be
dismissed if the current owner produced an affidavit indicating that the property had been
purchased from the commissioner of forfeited estates.339 The defendant produced a proper
affidavit and asked that the suit be dismissed.340 The plaintiff countered that the statute deprived
him of his constitutional right to a jury trial and therefore it was void.341
The judges expressed reluctance to dispute the wisdom of the legislature, but felt
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compelled to examine the validity of the statute because of the solemnity of their oaths.342 The
court began by noting that every citizen had a right to a trial by jury in cases of disputed title to
property.343 If the legislature could take away this fundamental right, the court observed, then
they also had the authority to transform the character of state government from republican to
monarchical.344 The judiciary, being “bound to take notice of [the constitution] as much as of any
other law,” could not permit such a result.345 Accordingly, the court ordered that the case should
be tried by a jury because the act of the legislature was without effect.346
Undoubtedly, the Bayard court exercised judicial review over an act of the legislature.
The Bayard decision cannot be characterized as an act of statutory construction in the tradition of
Dr. Bonham’s Case. Recognizing that the legislature was not the ultimate sovereign of the state,
the court specifically noted that it could “take notice” of the constitution. In other words, the
constitution was not exclusively in the orbit of the legislative branch as in Great Britain.
Because a jury trial was fundamental to a system of ordered liberty, the court was required to
strike down the offending statute.
5.

Ham v. McClaws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93 (1789).347

In late 1788, a family of British settlers left the Bay of Honduras for South Carolina.348
Prior to leaving Honduras, the settlers researched South Carolina law to determine whether they
could safely bring their seven slaves into the state.349 The research revealed no prohibition, but
during the voyage the state legislature passed a law prohibiting foreigners, on penalty of
forfeiture, from importing slaves into South Carolina.350 The statute also provided that the
forfeited slaves would be given to the person reporting the illegal entry into the state.351
Upon the settlers’ entry into South Carolina, a revenue officer brought suit under the
statute to claim the forfeited slaves.352 The settlers challenged the statute’s constitutionality,
citing to Dr. Bonham’s Case and arguing that the inequitable result could never have been
contemplated by the legislature.353 They had not intentionally violated the statute and could not
have learned of its passage while in transit.354 Hence, the real “intention of the legislature[] must
have been to exempt those negroes from forfeiture, who were upon the way, or on the point of
arriving in the State, under the sanction of former law, when the latter act passed.”355
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In a one-paragraph opinion, the court agreed with the settlers.356 “It is clear,” held the
court, “that statutes passed against the plain and obvious principles of common right, and
common reason, are absolutely null and void, as far as they are calculated to operate against
those principles.”357 Because the wise and just General Assembly “never had it in their
contemplation to make a forfeiture of the negroes in question,” the court construed the statute to
deny a forfeiture.358
Broadly reading the opinion, one could argue that the court struck the statute as applied to
the settlers and thus exercised the power of judicial review. More likely, the court simply
exercised the rules of statutory construction as Coke did in Dr. Bonham’s Case and Judge Duane
did with the Trespass Act in Rutgers. The court simply did not believe the legislature could have
intended the forfeiture under the circumstances presented. Because the Ham opinion is so brief,
further speculation on the intent of the court is difficult.
6.

Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay ) 252 (1792).359

Bowman concerned a 1712 act of the South Carolina General Assembly transferring a
freehold from one holder and his heirs to another.360 The court’s reported opinion is very short:
The Court, (present, GRIMKE and BAY, justices) who after a full
consideration on the subject were clearly of opinion, that the plaintiffs could
claim no title under the act in question, as it was against common right, as well as
against Magna Charta, to take away the freehold of one man, and vest it in
another; and that too, to the prejudice of third persons, without any compensation,
or even a trial by jury of the country to determine the right in question. That the
act was therefore, ipso facto, void. That no length of time could give it validity,
being originally founded on erroneous principles. That the parties however
might, if they chose, rely upon a possessory right, if they could establish it.361
Like the Ham opinion before it, the Bowman opinion lacks analysis. However, the
language used regarding common right and reason is likely taken from Dr. Bonham’s Case. The
South Carolina court apparently interpreted that case as providing supporting authority for its
holding. Because there was no citation to the case or discussion of Dr. Bonham’s Case, we can
only speculate about Justices Grimke’s and Bay’s understanding of this English precedent. We
do not know whether they viewed Dr. Bonham’s Case as resting on a rule of statutory
construction or whether they viewed it as establishing judicial authority over acts of an elected
assembly. Because of the brevity of the opinion, Bowman raises more questions than answers
about early American attitude toward judicial review.
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7.

Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793)362

Kamper involved the constitutionality of a Virginia statute giving state general court
judges the equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions and to hear suits commenced by
injunction.363 Prior to the statute in question, such jurisdiction was reserved for the state
chancery court.364 The statute was challenged on grounds that it circumvented constitutional
provisions requiring judges be appointed by the joint ballot of both houses of legislature
followed by an executive commission for good behavior.365 All five judges who heard the case
issued separate opinions on the propriety of judicial review and the validity of the statute.
Judge Nelson began his opinion by observing that the legislature “derive their existence
from the Constitution.”366 It thus followed that the legislature cannot alter the document—such
power, in Judge Nelson’s view, resided in the people of Virginia.367 He candidly admitted that
some Virginians believed that the judiciary assumed the power of the legislature or placed itself
above the legislature when exercising judicial review.368 In response to this objection, Judge
Nelson averred that he did not consider the judiciary to be “champions of the people, or the
Constitution, bound to sound the alarm” when the legislature exceeded its powers.369 But, if the
courts were presented with actual cases or controversies between litigants, the courts were bound
to rule.370 This review of legislation, Judge Nelson asserted, was no “novelty.”371 He observed
that often “one statute is virtually repealed by another, and the judiciary must decide which is the
law, or whether both can exist together.”372 After this discussion of judicial review, Judge
Nelson held that that statute was unconstitutional because it attempted to overturn constitutional
requirements for the appointment of judges.373
Next, Judge Spencer Roane considered the statute. Judge Roane began by observing that
the case had originated in his court and that he had referred it to the general court because of the
issue’s import.374 He further commented that in the lower court he had “doubted how far the
judiciary were authorized to refuse to execute a law, on the ground of it being against the spirit
of the Constitution.”375 On further reflection, Judge Roane noted, he had changed his opinion: “I
now think that the judiciary may and ought not only refuse to execute a law expressly repugnant
to the Constitution; but also one which is, by a plain and natural construction, in opposition to
the fundamental principles thereof.”376 In other words, the judiciary should strike laws violating
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express provisions and those violating the spirit of the document. In support of his new opinion,
Judge Roane declared that the people were “the only sovereign” power and that the legislature
was subordinate to them and the constitution.377 It naturally followed that the legislature could
not alter the constitution’s procedure for appointing judges by a mere statute.378 To hold
otherwise would permit the legislature to infringe upon the constitution “and the liberties of the
people” would be “wholly at the mercy of the legislature.”379 Having established the principles
of judicial review, Judge Roane agreed that the statute was repugnant to the constitution.
Judge Henry began his opinion by observing that the issue before the court was both
delicate and important.380 He then recounted some history of the Revolution and turned to
founding principles. Prior to the Revolution, Judge Henry observed, Americans were “taught
that Parliament was omnipotent, and their powers beyond control.”381 With the Virginia
Constitution, this legislative power was limited because the constitution was “founded on the
authority of the people.”382 Turning to the statute, Judge Henry could not reconcile it with the
constitutional provisions for judicial appointments. To uphold the statute, he observed, “would
be a solecism in government—establishing the will of the legislature, servants of the people, to
control the will of their masters.” Such an outcome could not be permitted.
Judge Tyler was the fourth judge to deliver an opinion in Kamper. Like his colleagues,
he led off with fundamentals. He observed that the Constitution was a “great contract of the
people” and was thus “paramount law.”383 He doubted that any branch of government could
lawfully ignore the enumerated rights of the people or the plan of government outlined in the
constitution.384 If one branch did choose to violate the Constitution, it should not expect
assistance from another branch “to aid in the violation of this sacred letter.”385 He reminded his
colleagues that Parliament’s claim of supreme power was “an abominable insult upon the honour
and good sense of our country.”386 In post-revolutionary Virginia, only “the God of Heaven and
our constitution” could claim true omnipotence.387 Based upon these principles, Judge Tyler
declared it his duty to rule upon the constitutionality of statutes that were presented in cases and
controversies.388 Recognizing the nature of this power, he noted that the alleged “violation must
be plain and clear, or there might be a danger of the judiciary preventing the operation of laws
which might be productive of much public good.”389 Upon consideration of the extension of
equity jurisdiction, Judge Tyler concurred that the statute circumvented constitutional provisions
requiring judges be appointed by the joint ballot of both houses of legislature followed by an
executive commission for good behavior.
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The last opinion was delivered by Judge St. George Tucker. In determining the source of
ultimate power, Tucker looked to the people and described them as possessing “sovereign,
unlimited, and unlimitable authority.”390 Governments possessed only that authority delegated
by the people, Tucker noted, which was in sharp contrast to the British theory of legislative
omnipotence.391 With the source of power established, Tucker declared that Virginia “legislators
derive their power from the constitution”; therefore, “they can[not] change it[] without
destroying the foundation of their authority.” As the body charged with expounding laws,
Tucker continued, the judiciary is obligated “to take notice of the constitution, as the first law of
the land; and that whatsoever is contradictory thereto, is not the law of the land.”392 Endorsing
judicial power and quoting from The Federalist Papers, Tucker described the courts as “‘an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature’” designed to “‘keep the latter within
the limits assigned to their authority.’”393 In the performance of their duties, courts ascertain the
meaning of the Constitution “as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body.”394 But would not such a power place the judiciary above the legislative?
According to Tucker, no. It only means that the people are superior to both branches and thus
the judges must follow the instructions of the people as found in fundamental law.395 In
following the people’s Constitution, Tucker agreed with his four colleagues and struck the statute
expanding equity jurisdiction as a violation of Virginia’s fundamental law.
The five opinions present an extraordinary discussion of judicial review and should be
read by law students prior to a study of Marbury. Writing just ten years after the Treaty of Paris
ended the Revolutionary War, the Kamper judges all mentioned the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty and how this had been replaced by popular sovereignty in Virginia. With the demise
of legislative omnipotence, courts were required to “take notice” of the constitution when
deciding cases and controversies. Constitutional law was no longer reserved for the legislature.
Properly, there is also a respect for the raw power of judicial review. For example, Judge
Tyler articulated the doubtful case rule when he declared that the “violation must be plain and
clear, or there might be a danger of the judiciary preventing the operation of laws which might be
productive of much public good.”396 This is a recognition that the judiciary is also capable of
usurpation and that judges must be extremely careful when challenging an act of the people’s
representatives.
Although all Kamper judges endorsed judicial review, we find disagreement on the
charge of the courts. Judge Nelson denied that courts were the people’s champion and duty
bound to sound the alarm when the legislature exceeded its powers. Judge Tucker, on the other
hand, believed the courts were duty bound to interpose between the people and the legislature to
protect the liberties of the former from the latter. These disagreements aside, both judges
concurred that courts should strike a legislative act when it is contrary to the constitution.
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8.

State v. _________, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28 (1794)397

In 1794, the North Carolina Superior Court examined a state statute permitting the
attorney general to obtain a default judgment against receivers of public money.398 Judge
Williams sua sponte questioned the statute’s validity because provisions in the state bill of rights
provided that “[n]o freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or disseised of his freehold, liberties
or property . . . but by the law of the land.”399 The law of the land, according to Judge Williams,
required that the receivers be accorded an opportunity to be heard before a jury of their peers.400
The attorney general objected that the state bill of rights did not restrict the legislature, but was
directed to foreign powers that might claim a right to interfere with North Carolina’s internal
government.401
Holding the bill of rights restricted the legislature, Judge Williams rejected the attorney
general’s argument.402 In defending his authority to void an act of the legislature, Judge
Williams noted that the people’s representatives were “deputed only to make laws in conformity
to the constitution, and within the limits it prescribes.”403 When the legislature exceeds its
authority, its “acts are no more binding than the acts of any other assembled body.”404 If he did
not undertake his “duty to resist an unconstitutional act,” the people’s liberties would be
jeopardized and the constitution overthrown.405 Refusing to accept defeat, the attorney general
asked a two-judge panel to reconsider the Judge Williams’s ruling.406 Without revealing their
reasoning, the panel held that the attorney general could proceed with default judgments.407
Although the court did not nullify an act of the legislature, the opinion of Judge Williams
indicates that such judicial action was not beyond the pale in North Carolina. We find no history
lesson on the power of Parliament in his opinion, but we do see emphasis on the limitation of the
legislature’s power via a written constitution. Also implicit in Judge Williams’s opinion is the
notion that the judiciary is the guardian of the people’s rights as declared in the people’s
fundamental law. This combination of factors led him to sanction the power of judicial review,
but his decision was effectively overruled by the panel.
9.

Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L (2 Bay) 38 (1796)408

Lindsay dealt with the power eminent domain. The South Carolina General Assembly
enacted a statute permitting the Charleston City Council to take property to build a new street.409
397
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The statute did not provide that the owners be paid just compensation.410 The owners argued that
this lack of compensation violated state constitutional provisions providing that a person could
not be “disseised of his freehold . . . but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land.”411 They asked that the judges, “who were the constitutional guardians of the rights of the
people, to declare this act as far as it deprives the owners of their freehold estates without
compensation, null and void.”412
The court split evenly over this issue. Justices Grimke and Bay ruled that the power of
eminent domain was vested in the legislature and that there was no requirement that an owner
receive compensation for the taking of his property.413 Justices Burke and Waites disagreed,
ruling that the owners were entitled to just compensation to be ascertained by a jury of their
peers.414 Waites’s opinion is the most notable of the three for his discussion of judicial review.
Waites stated that “it was painful for him to be obliged to question the exercise of
legislative power, but he was sworn to support the constitution.”415 Permitting the legislature to
violate the constitution, Justice Waites noted, subjected the people to mere “legislative will.”416
In protection of the people, the court must do its “duty in giving to the constitution an overruling
operation over every act of the legislature which is inconsistent with it.”417 This judicial role
provides an “independent security” for the rights of the citizenry.
Anticipating objections to his opinion, Justice Waites denied that his opinion advocated
“judicial supremacy.”418 If an act is held void, Justice Waites wrote, “it is not because the judges
have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the constitution,”
which is the ultimate expression of the people’s will.419
Although the split in the court prevented an exercise of judicial review, Justice Waites’s
opinion shares much in common with the Kamper opinions. Justice Waites denied legislative
supremacy and instead appealed to the people’s ultimate sovereignty. The courts, to Justice
Waites, were protectors of the people’s liberties. The constitution was a limitation on the
legislature’s power and he had no choice but to refer to the constitution when judging the validity
of a statute. Because the statute was incongruent with provisions of the constitution, Justice
Waites would have struck it down.
10.

Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799)420

In 1795, the Pennsylvania legislature delegated to the City of Philadelphia the power to
prohibit construction of wooden buildings in certain parts of the city.421 In 1796, the City passed
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an ordinance pursuant to the state statute.422 Less than a year after the passage of the ordinance,
Duquet built a wooden structure in the forbidden area and was indicted in the mayor’s court.423
After the case was removed to the state supreme court, Duquet challenged the statute as
unconstitutional.424 At base, he argued that the constitution prohibited a delegation of power to
the extent that a city could institute prosecutions in the mayor’s court.425 Only the attorney
general as a representative of the sovereign people, Duquet argued, could prosecute “general
public offenders.”426
In a short opinion written by Chief Justice Shippen, the Pennsylvania supreme court
found no impropriety with the city prosecuting offenders in the mayor’s court.427 Regarding
judicial review, the court noted that “a breach of the constitution by the legislature, and the
clashing of the law with the constitution, must be evident indeed, before we should think
ourselves at liberty to declare a law void.”428 Although the statute in question was constitutional,
the court made clear that in the appropriate case it would not “shrink from the task of saying such
a law is void.”429
The Duquet court embraced judicial review although it did not exercise this power. The
court also articulated the doubtful case rule, making clear that it would not strike an act of the
legislature except for the most grievous violations of the constitution. In these regards,
Pennsylvania seemed in line with it sister states on the subject of judicial review.
12.

Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236 (Md. 1802).430

Whittington dealt with a statute reorganizing the Maryland judiciary.431 The statute,
among other things, removed William Whittington as the chief justice of the county courts and
replaced him with William Polk.432 Whittington challenged the statute as unconstitutional
because he held his office during good behavior.433
As typical of other courts reviewing legislative acts, the Whittington court began its
opinion noting that the people were the source of all power and that they had delegated to
government only certain powers.434 It followed that the legislature could not be the judge of its
own powers because that would “establish a despotism.”435 The court observed that the people
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could not police the boundaries of power because they could only be heard during elections.436
But under the constitution, the judiciary was the “barrier” established to “resist the oppression”
of constitutional infringements.437 It thus fell to the courts “to determine whether an act of the
legislature . . . is made pursuant to” the constitution.438 The court admitted that the judiciary
might at times fail to properly interpret the constitution, but this was no reason to argue against
the exercise of judicial review.439 According to the court, “the judges are liable to be removed
from office, on conviction of misbehaviour, in a court of law.”440
Dealing with the statute in question, the court held that justices of the county courts
served during the pleasure of the governor and could be removed at any time.441 The
constitution’s good behavior provision applied only to the court of appeals, general court, and
admiralty court.442 Consequently, Whittington had not been unconstitutionally deprived of his
office.
Noteworthy in the Whittington case is the unequivocal assertion that the courts are the
guardians of the people’s liberties and the assumption that the ballot box is an insufficient
weapon to prevent legislative excesses. The court candidly admitted that the judicial branch, like
the other branches, could usurp constitutional power. To remedy this, the court saw
impeachment as a real threat if the judge’s abused their power of constitutional interpretation.
Through impeachment the people’s representatives could remove an offending judge and restore
legislative power.
13.

State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427 (1802).443

Parkhurst concerned the constitutionality of a statute providing that when any citizen
holding a commission under state law accepted a position as senator or representative in the
United States Congress, the commission was deemed vacated.444 Aaron Ogden was the clerk of
the Essex County Court of Common Pleas and was later elected to the United States Senate.445
Ogden
The clerkship was deemed vacated and Jabez Parkhurst accepted the position.446
challenged that constitutionality of the statute, arguing that under the state constitution clerks
served a five-year term unless impeached.447 Observing that the term had not expired and he had
not been impeached, Ogden argued that a mere legislative enactment could not trump the terms
of the constitution.448
The state supreme court ruled in favor of Ogden, but its written opinion has not
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survived.449 Chief Justice Kirkpatrick issued a separate opinion, which has survived, ruling
against Ogden on the grounds that the office of clerk and senator are incompatible under the
common law; therefore, acceptance of the second position acts as a surrender of the first.450 In
dicta, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick addressed the argument of Parkhurst that “the constitution itself
is in the hands of the legislature, and may be altered at pleasure” inasmuch as “the legislature are
the ultimate judges of the constitution.”451
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick began by defining a constitution as “an agreement of the
people, in their individual capacities, reduced to writing, establishing and fixing certain
principles for the government of themselves.”452 Describing the people as “supreme in power,”
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick observed that they had delegated to the state legislature only certain
defined powers.453 To hold that the legislature could alter the constitution at will would be, in
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick’s words, “a perfect absurdity” by “making the creature greater than the
creator.”454 Based on the nature of the constitution, state and federal case law endorsing judicial
review, and his oath to execute his office “agreeably to the constitution,” Chief Justice
Kirkpatrick concluded that a court could strike an act of the legislature.455
In sum, in the state cases prior to Marbury, we can discern the development of principles
that underpin judicial review. Without the context of these early decisions, Marbury can easily
be misinterpreted. In the early 1780s, judges were reluctant to exercise judicial review as
demonstrated by Judge Duane in Rutgers and Judge Pendleton in Caton. For many years in
England the judicial power was considered a branch of the executive department and this view
was accepted by some American thinkers. After 1776, the states curtailed executive power and
transferred most of this power to the legislature. This, coupled with long-standing principles of
British constitutionalism dictated that the legislature should be the most powerful branch of
government. Only as principles of popular sovereignty gained wider acceptance and
understanding did Americans become more comfortable with judicial power. The reaction to the
Rutgers decision and the Trevett decision are prime examples of the early distrust of judicial
power.
When courts began to declare acts of the legislature void, they based their power on
popular sovereignty and the people’s choice to limit the power of government via a written
constitution. Hence, many of the later opinions (e.g., Kamper and Lindsay) contain a discussion
of the history of the Revolution, the powers claimed by the British Parliament, and the
establishment of popular sovereignty in the states. The power of the people formed the basis of
the judges’ exercise of judicial review. With the legislature no longer the ultimate sovereign and
master of the constitution, courts could take notice of the constitution when judging between its
terms and the terms of a statute. As a co-equal branch, a court need not bow to legislative power
nor was it obligated to assist the legislature in a constitutional violation. The judges’ oath (e.g.,
Parkhurst) prohibited the courts from turning a bind eye toward legislative usurpation.
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Many courts realized that the power of judicial review could be abused. For this reason,
several judges articulated the doubtful case rule. Unless the constitutional violation was clear
and unambiguous, a court should not strike the act of a legislature. In doubtful cases, a court
should defer to the popular branch. If a judge declined to exercise the doubtful case rule, the
Parkhurst opinion suggested that he could be impeached. Judicial activism, according to Chief
Justice Kirkpatrick, constituted grounds for removal.
Because the power of judicial review was based on the court being a co-equal branch of
government, none of the pre-Marbury cases even hint that courts might be the final arbiter of
constitutions. The power to take notice of a constitution does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that courts, or any other branch taking notice of the constitution, has the final say on a
constitution’s meaning. It was a big enough step and early on very controversial for the courts to
claim equality with the legislature in considering the constitution. A claim of judicial supremacy
was thus unthinkable and was never made.
D. And Then Came Marbury
When the Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison456 in 1803, it was not
trailblazing.457 As shown above, state courts had discussed the doctrine of judicial review and
exercised judicial review since the early 1780s. Viewed against the backdrop of these cases, the
reasoning of Marbury becomes clear: the Supreme Court, just like Congress and the president,
can take notice of the Constitution. Viewed contextually, it is difficult to discern how
generations of scholars and judges have cited Marbury for the proposition that the Supreme
Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution—the one branch to which the executive and
legislative must defer in matters of constitutional interpretation. This popular interpretation
cannot stand up under even moderate scrutiny.
The background to Marbury is well known. In the 1800 elections, John Adams and his
Federalist Party lost control of the White House and Congress. In the late 1790s, via the Alien
and Sedition Acts, the Federalists had made it a crime to criticize the national government and
gave President Adams the power to deport foreigners based on the president’s reasonable
suspicion that the foreigner had a secret design against the government.458 Outraged at such
illiberal measures, the people gave the Republicans a 24-seat majority in the House of
Representatives and elected Thomas Jefferson to the presidency.459 Desiring to place as many
Federalists in office before turning over power to Jefferson and his Republican Party, the lame
duck Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801 during the chill of February.460 Among other
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things, the Act created new circuit courts staffed by 16 judges as well as justices of the peace for
the District of Columbia. 461
William Marbury had been appointed by President Adams, confirmed by the Senate, but
failed to receive his commission before Jefferson assumed office.462 Bringing suit within the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Marbury asked for a writ of mandamus ordering
Secretary of State James Madison to deliver his commission as justice of the peace.463 In
examining Marbury’s claim, the Court framed three issues: (1) whether Marbury had a right to
the commission, (2) if such a right existed, whether the law afforded him a remedy, and (3) if a
remedy existed, whether the requested mandamus was the proper remedy.464
Regarding the first inquiry, the Court held that Marbury did have a right to the
commission. Marbury had been nominated by President Adams, confirmed by the Senate, and
his commission had been sealed by the secretary of state.465 By this process he had a vested right
because there was no other solemnity required by law.466 With the process having proceeded so
far, the executive’s power over the appointment terminated.467 President Jefferson, according to
the Court, improperly interfered with the process when he instructed Secretary of State Madison
to hold the sealed commission.
In considering the existence of a remedy, the Court recognized that some executive
functions are purely political and thus not the subject of judicial scrutiny.468 “But where a
specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon performance of that duty,”
the Court reasoned, “it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has
a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.”469 If this were not true, the federal
government would cease being a government of laws, and the executive would enjoy greater
power than the king of Great Britain.470 Because delivery of the sealed commission was not a
political act, the Court concluded that Marbury, having been deprived of a vested right, had
recourse to the courts to seek redress of his injury.471
Finally, the Court turned to the question of whether it could issue a writ of mandamus to
Secretary of State Madison commanding him to deliver the sealed commission to Marbury.
After a discussion of the nature of the writ, the Court observed that its power to issue writs of
mandamus originated in section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.472 The Constitution, however,
grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction only “[i]n cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party.”473 In all other cases,
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the Court has appellate jurisdiction subject to congressional regulation.474 Because Article Three
mentions nothing about issuing writs of mandamus as part of the Court’s original jurisdiction,
the Court had to consider whether a mere act of Congress could alter original jurisdiction to
permit issuance of the writ in cases falling within original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction.475
As so many state courts had done in the two decades prior to Marbury, the Supreme
Court turned to the first principle of popular sovereignty: “That the people have an original right
to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce
to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected.”476
Recognizing the people as ultimate sovereigns, the Court described the people as having
“original and supreme will.”477 Exercising this supreme power, the people created three
departments of government with limited and defined powers.478 So “that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”479 Again recognizing the majesty of the
people, the Court averred that “the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it.”480
The Court specifically denied that Congress could alter the people’s Constitution by a mere
ordinary act of legislation.481 From this discussion of ultimate sovereignty, it naturally followed
“that and act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”482
If the Constitution is paramount, then must the courts simply follow the direction of the
legislature and give effect to their enactments? Such a proposition, according to the Court, was
“an absurdity too gross to be insisted on.”483 “[O]f necessity,” the Court continued, the judiciary
must “expound and interpret” the law. 484 Often courts are faced with conflicting statutes and
they “must decide on the operation of each” to decide the case or controversy presented.485
Hence, the Court declared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”486 With sovereignty no longer vested in the legislative body,
“courts are to regard the constitution” when performing their judicial duties.487 To do otherwise
would “controvert the very foundation of all written constitutions” and give the people’s agent
(i.e., Congress) a power greater than the principal.488 It would give the legislature “a practical
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and real omnipotence.”489
The Court then set about giving examples of its duty to refer to the Constitution when
adjudicating, specifically discussing conditional prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, and the levying of duties on exported goods.490 The clearest example given dealt
with treason. The Constitution provides that “[n]o Person shall be convicted of Treason unless
on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”491
What if Congress decreed that “one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for
conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?”492 To give effect to
such an enactment, the Court concluded, would be a violation of the judges’ oath.493 Although
Congress violated its oath if it attempted to alter the law of treason by mere statute, nothing
required judges to join in the violation.494 Hence, Congress’s attempt to alter original
jurisdiction by statute failed and the Court refused to issue the writ of mandamus.
Marbury, then, was simply the federal version of Kamper. Both cases examined whether
an act of the legislature could expand court jurisdiction in the face of a clear constitutional
provision to the contrary; reached the same result, although in Kamper we are treated to five
separate opinions and more in-depth reasoning on what was a novel issue at the time; and put the
judiciary on par with the legislative branch. But neither Kamper nor Marbury declared the court
greater than the legislature.
Such an understanding is borne out by contemporary reaction to the Marbury opinion.
Although Jefferson’s Republicans and Marshall’s Federalists believed themselves to be in a
battle for the survival of republicanism in America,495 the Republican newspapers expressed
little hostility toward the opinion.496 James Madison, the defendant in the case, paid even less
attention the decision or its ramifications. Madison put not a single comment in writing about
the decision.497 Jefferson’s objections to the opinion were grounded in Marshall’s criticism of
Jefferson’s decision to deny Marbury his right to the commission (issues one and two discussed
in the opinion).498 The Republicans’ failure to criticize the Court’s discussion of judicial review
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is a strong indicator that there was little or no disagreement on this third point of the opinion.499
We must remember that Jefferson was a champion of the people and principles of popular
sovereignty that denied the legislature the exclusive right to interpret or modify the
Constitution.500 Similar to the reasoning of so many state judges on the subject, Jefferson
believed all three branches of government could interpret the Constitution.
Jefferson’s theory of constitutional interpretation is best explained in his September 11,
1804 letter to Abigail Adams. In responding to Mrs. Adams’s criticism of Jefferson’s decision to
pardon the men convicted under the Sedition Act, Jefferson averred that “nothing in the
Constitution has given [the judges] a right to decide for the Executive, more than the Executive
to decide for them” on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act.501 Alluding to principles of
separation of powers, Jefferson observed that both branches “are equally independent in the
sphere of action assigned to them.”502 Although he believed that the Sedition Act was
unconstitutional, he conceded that “[t]he judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to
pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment.”503 Likewise, “the Executive, believing the law to be
unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it.”504 Jefferson summed up his
understanding of the Constitution as follows:
That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each
other. But the opinion which gives to judges the right to decide what laws are
constitutional, and what are not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of
action, but for the Legislature & Executive also, in their spheres, would make the
judiciary a despotic branch.505
Jefferson realized that the co-ordinate braches would occasionally disagree on matters of
constitutional interpretation. Rather than any one branch having the power to decide for the
others, he envisioned the people acting through the ballot box or in convention making the final
decision. In Jefferson’s draft of his first annual message to Congress, he explained his
departmentalist theory in a manner similar to his 1804 letter to Mrs. Adams. After discussing his
response to the Sedition Act, he stated that the Constitution “has provided for it’s own
reintegration by a change of persons exercising the functions of those departments.”506 To
Jefferson, this is exactly what happened in the 1800 election (Revolution of 1800): “the
Revolution of 1800 was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776
was in its form; not effected indeed by the sword, as that, but by the rational and peaceable
instrument of reform, the suffrage of the people.”507
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As early as 1783, Jefferson believed that a convention of the people was the proper body
to settle disputes of interpretation. In his 1783 draft of a constitution for Virginia, Jefferson
provided that any two branches of the government by a two-thirds vote in each branch could
summon a constitutional convention for altering or correcting breaches of the constitution.508
Forty years later, Jefferson continued to believe that the people acting in convention were the
final arbiters of the constitution.509
Because the High Court’s Marbury opinion did not run afoul of Jefferson’s
departmentalist theory nor call into doubt the sovereignty of the people, the decision was not a
threat. Marbury simply announced departmentalist doctrine: the Court as well as the other
branches possess the power to interpret the Constitution. Without the historical context of the
development of the doctrine of sovereignty, its importance to our Revolution, and its part in the
early formation of judicial review in the 1780s, modern Americans have difficulty in
understanding Marbury and its modest holding. After all, for decades American lawyers have
been told that the Marbury Court declared itself the final authority on the Constitution.
Inculcation of this point coupled with observation of present practice in which the Court is the
final say on the Constitution explains why the importance and meaning of Marbury continues to
be overstated.
V.

Conclusion

The divine right of kings, although antedating the Stuarts, will forever be associated with
James I and his descendents. As did Bodin in République, the Stuarts contended that the king
was God’s lieutenant on earth and beyond the control of any earthly body. If the king violated
natural or positive law, his subjects could only politely remonstrate and take solace that God
would punish the king in the afterlife. The king’s subjects could not take active measures to
protect their rights and liberties.
During the 1600s, Englishmen challenged the king’s claim that ultimate sovereignty
resided in the monarch’s royal person. This was an expensive challenge resulting in the English
Civil War and ending with the Glorious Revolution. In the turmoil of the late 1640s, Englishmen
debated the first principles of society and some voices argued for principles of popular
sovereignty to replace divine right theory. Under Leveller theory, departments of government
were but agents of the people and could only exercise delegated powers with the consent of the
people. To put theory into practice, the Levellers created the Agreement of the People which
was a written constitution whereby the people, as ultimate sovereigns, delegated certain powers
to their representatives in Parliament. Such a theory was ahead of its time and a form of it was
eventually adopted in the constitutions of independent American states in the 1770s.
Rather than replacing divine right theory with popular sovereignty, the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 laid the foundation for parliamentary sovereignty. By the 1760s, it was
settled that Parliament, in the words of Blackstone, possessed an “absolute despotic power” that
was uncontrollable. Parliament could modify the constitution or the statutes of the realm at will.
Neither the king, law courts, nor people could override the actions of Parliament.
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The American colonists challenged parliamentary sovereignty with the Revolution.
Originally, the Americans argued that ultimate sovereignty resided in each state legislature. But
as the Americans reflected more on the doctrine of sovereignty, they reached conclusions similar
to that of the Levellers. Ultimate power could not reside in one person such as the king or an
artificial body such as Parliament. Sovereignty resided in the people. Only the people could
possess what Bodin or Blackstone would recognize as sovereignty. While the people’s agents
(e.g., representatives, governors, and judges) often exercise great power, this power is derived
from the people and is inferior to the people’s ultimate sovereignty.
The American theory of popular sovereignty had a profound effect on the power of the
courts. Under the British system, Parliament was the master of statutory and constitutional law.
Courts did not have the power to compare a parliamentary enactment with the courts’
understanding of the constitution. Judicial review did not exist. With the establishment of the
people as the sovereign, the three branches of government became co-equal agents of their
common master. In performing their constitutional duties, all three branches were bound to
interpret the constitution. No one branch was all powerful. Unaccustomed to reviewing acts of
legislation, some courts continued to defer to the legislature as if it were still sovereign. By the
early 1790s, courts were more comfortable with “taking notice” of the constitution. The much
vaunted Marbury decision was simply a federal chapter in this story of American judicial review.
Today, Marbury is cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of
the Constitution. This interpretation divorces Marbury from its historical roots and grossly
overstates the holding of that case. Whereas popular sovereignty provides clear support for the
doctrine of judicial review, it provides no support for judicial supremacy. Popular sovereignty
explicitly rejected the proposition that a mere branch of government had the final word on
fundamental law. Unlike judicial review, judicial supremacy is not an outgrowth of popular
sovereignty. Instead, it is a regression to an older theory of sovereignty that existed prior to our
Revolution. Judicial supremacy places the Supreme Court in the position of Parliament. Having
the final word in constitutional interpretation, the Court can make or unmake any law as it sees
fit. Other than a very difficult amendment process, the people can do nothing to control it.
Judicial supremacy actually poses a greater danger to the people than a system of
parliamentary sovereignty. At least members of the House of Commons are subject to popular
elections. The Supreme Court is not subject to this check nor are most of the courts of last resort
on the state level.510 Impeachment, as suggested by Chief Justice Kirkpatrick, is seldom used
and provides no real check on judicial authority. To the extent Americans still adhere to popular
sovereignty, perhaps they should reconsider Jefferson’s proposal found in his 1783 draft of a
constitution for Virginia as the proper method for settling conflicts between co-equal branches of
government. Such an appeal to the people is consistent with the principles of our Revolution and
would restore co-equal status to the three branches of government.
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